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MOTIVATION MATTERS:
GUIDELINE 10.13 AND OTHER MECHANISMS FOR
PREVENTING LAWYERS FROM SURRENDERING
TO SELF-INTEREST IN RESPONDING TO
ALLEGATIONS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES
Tigran W. Eldred*

I.

INTRODUCTION

After Wesley Ira Purkey was sentenced to death, he followed the
familiar path of filing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against
his trial lawyer.' Initially, the lawyer seemed willing to protect Purkey's
interests, even after this claim against him, stating that he would not
provide any information to the prosecution without a court order to do
SO.2 In turn, the post-conviction court ordered the lawyer to file an
affidavit addressing Purkey's claims.3 It is what happened next that is
remarkable. Instead of filing a limited affidavit, narrowly tailored to the
allegations in the petition for habeas corpus, the lawyer filed an
extensive, 117-page affidavit that, according to Purkey, far exceeded the
* Associate Professor of Law, New England Law I Boston. Special thanks to Eric
Freedman, David Siegel, Bruce Green, Babe Howell, Lawrence Friedman, Jordan Singer, Alafair
Burke, Jennifer Gundlach, and Jennifer Stumpf for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
Article. Thanks also to librarians, Brian Flaherty and Barry Stems, and to my excellent research
assistants, Alex Aferiat and Simon Caine.
1. See Purkey v. United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W, 2010 WL 4386532, at *1 (W.D. Mo.
Oct. 28, 2010); David M. Siegel, My Reputation or Your Liberty (or Your Life): The Ethical
Obligationsof CriminalDefense Counsel in PostconvictionProceedings,23 J. LEGAL PROF. 85, 9091 (1999) [hereinafter Siegel, My Reputation or Your Liberty] ("While any criminal defense lawyer
whose client is convicted is subject to the possibility of a claim for ineffective assistance, lawyers in
capital cases are virtually guaranteed such claims.").
2. See Purkey, 2010 WL 4386532, at *7 (noting that the attomey produced the affidavit after
it was ordered by the court); Letter from Frederick Duchardt to the U.S. Attorney's Office (Oct. 30,
2007) (on file with Hofstra Law Review).
3. See Purkey v. United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W, 2009 WL 5176598, at *2 (W.D. Mo.
Dec. 22, 2009).
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allegations in dispute. 4 Even more remarkably, twenty-five pages of the
affidavit were dedicated to legal analysis, including extensive citation of
legal authority arguing why the lawyer's conduct was not
constitutionally defective. 5 By any stretch of the imagination, this
argumentative response-described as more akin to an "adversarial
briefing ' 6 than an affidavit of factual information-did not seek to
protect Purkey's interests. Rather, it was a full throttled defense by
Purkey's trial lawyer of his own conduct.
Purkey v. United States7 demonstrates the importance of defining
with precision the role of predecessor counsel (as the lawyer accused of
ineffectiveness is known) in post-conviction proceedings. Often,
predecessor counsel will feel defensive about being accused of providing
deficient performance, especially in situations where a finding of
ineffectiveness will harm the lawyer's personal interests. As a result, the
lawyer may want to assist the prosecution to defend against the
allegation, or at least, not help the former client to prove it. Yet, the
lawyer who was purportedly ineffective is neither a formal party in the
litigation nor merely a witness with critical information in the case.
Rather, as the former advocate for the client who is now seeking relief,
predecessor counsel owes a set of continuing obligations to the very
person who is now challenging the lawyer's conduct.
Given the gravity and urgency of death penalty litigation, this
Article focuses on the continuing duties of predecessor counsel in capital
4. See Purkey, 2010 WL 4386532, at *7-8. The parties disagreed about whether the affidavit
was broader than necessary to address Purkey's claim of ineffectiveness. See id.Ultimately, the
court agreed with the prosecution, finding that the 117-page affidavit was appropriate to resolve the
allegations against the attorney. See id.at *8. By its own admission, the court reached this
conclusion without reviewing every specific detail set forth in the affidavit to determine whether the
lawyer exceeded what was appropriate to address and resolve the claims of ineffectiveness. See id.
(finding that the court is not required to analyze every response in the attorney's affidavit if it is
"reasonably necessary to answer the allegations").
5. See Reply to Government's Response to Movant's Application for Certificate of
Appealability at 15-16, Purkey, 2010 WI 4386532 (No. 06-8001-CV-W) (describing the advocacy
positions advanced in the trial attorney's affidavit); see also Purkey, 2010 WL 4386532, at *8.
Neither the prosecution nor the district court contested that the trial counsel's affidavit included
approximately twenty-five pages of legal argument. See generally Purkey, 2010 W 43846532.
However, an independent assessment is not possible because the affidavit itself was filed under seal
pursuant to a protective order, making it unavailable for review. See Docket Sheet at 1, Purkey,
2010 WL 4386532 (No. 06-8001-CV-W). The court granted the prosecution's motion to seal the
affidavit. See Purkey v. United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W, slip op. at 15-16 (W.D. Mo. May 19,
2008). This was based on a request that had been initiated by successor counsel. See Telephone
Interview with Teresa Norris, Partner, Blume Norris & Franklin-Best, LLC (Mar. 12, 2013) (Mar.
11,2013).
6. Reply to Government's Response to Movant's Application for Certificate of
Appealability, supranote 5, at 14.
7. No. 06-8001-CV-W, 2010 WL 4386532 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 28, 2010).
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cases. The starting point is Guideline 10.13 of the Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases ("ABA Guidelines" or "Guidelines"), 8 promulgated by the
American Bar Association ("ABA"), which set forth many of counsel's
central obligations. 9 These include a "continuing duty to safeguard the
interests of the [former] client," and the obligation to "cooperate fully
with successor counsel."1 ° Guideline 10.13 illustrates these obligations
with a series of examples-including the duty to maintain proper records
during representation, and thereafter, to provide information to successor
counsel and to cooperate in appropriate legal strategies during the
pendency of post-conviction proceedings. 1" And, while Guideline 10.13
does not specifically address duties relating to confidentiality and
privilege, the duty to safeguard the interests of the former client logically
includes such obligations. Further guidance comes from ABA Formal
Opinion 10-456, applicable in any case where ineffectiveness is alleged,
which concludes that lawyers may disclose information "reasonably
necessary" for resolution of the ineffectiveness claim, but only during a
formal judicial proceeding and only after the judge has determined that
such disclosure is appropriate."
The familiar standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, set forth
in Stricklandv. Washington,1 3 reveals why these continuing obligations
are so important. Under the Strickland test, a defendant must prove that
his former lawyer rendered deficient performance that prejudiced the
representation. 14 To satisfy this test, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that the challenged conduct "might be considered sound
trial strategy."' 5 Even with competent successor counsel and the means
8. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES (rev. ed. 2003), in 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913 (2003) [hereinafter ABA
GUIDELINES], availableat http://www.ambar.org/2003Guidelines.
9. See, e.g., id.
Guideline 10.13, at 1074.
10. Id. The title "successor counsel" denotes the lawyer who represents the defendant in the
post-conviction proceedings. See id.
11. Id. Guideline 10.13 cmt., at 1074-75.
12. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456 (2010), available
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/201 1 build/professional responsibility/
ethics opinion 10_456.authcheckdam.pdf, see also Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal,
Confidentialityand Claims ofIneffective Assistance, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2011, at 42, 42; David M.
Siegel, What (Can) (Should) (Must) Defense Counsel Withhold from the Prosecution in Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Proceedings?,CHAMPION, Dec. 2011, at 18, 18 [hereinafter Siegel, Withhold
from the Prosecution].
13. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
14. See id. at 687 (discussing the test for proving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
This test pays "a heavy measure of deference" to the strategic choices that were made by counsel.
See id. at 691.
15. Id.at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)) (internal quotation

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Val. 42:473

to investigate and pursue an ineffectiveness claim, it is difficult to meet
this heavy burden. 16 It becomes all the more difficult to prove
ineffectiveness of counsel when predecessor counsel is an obstacle to,
rather than an ally in, pursuing the claim.
As a result of the critical nature of these duties, scholars have
argued persuasively that lawyers must prioritize them. For example, as
my colleague David Siegel has demonstrated, lawyers who face claims
of ineffectiveness should place duties owed to former clients above their
own interests by zealously guarding the interests of their former clients,
even at personal risk to their own reputations. 17 Others have made
similar arguments, concluding that, while lawyers may have personal
misgivings about the prospect of being found ineffective, they must put
those feelings aside to satisfy the obligations owed to their former
clients. 18 And, because of the elevated stakes in capital cases, special
attention has been paid to the obligations of predecessor counsel set
forth in Guideline 10.13.19
One area that has not been explored, however, is the extent to
which lawyers accused of ineffectiveness are actually meeting these
professional duties. In other words, while, as a normative matter,
predecessor counsel should comply with the professional obligations set
forth in Guideline 10.13 and related authority--even at a personal costhow often do they so comply? Unfortunately, there is sparse data
directly on point, as the informal interactions between lawyers
throughout post-conviction proceedings infrequently result in reported
decisions. Other sources of authority, such as the opinions of seasoned

marks omitted); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1404 (2011) (quoting Strickland,466
U.S. at 689).
16. See NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING
NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 39-41 (2009), available at

http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf (describing the difficulty of prevailing on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel); Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight andAfter-the-Fact
Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 (noting the difficulty of
proving ineffectiveness, "even if the defendant's lawyer was asleep, drunk, unprepared, or
unknowledgeable").
17. See Siegel, My Reputation or Your Liberty, supra note 1, at 88-89; David M. Siegel, The
Role of Trial Counsel in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: Three Questions to Keep in
Mind, CHAMPION, Feb. 2009, at 14, 15 [hereinafter Siegel, Three Questions]; Siegel, Withholdfrom
the Prosecution,supra note 12, at 19-20.
18. Michael Mears, The Defense Attorney's Ethical Response to Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claims, GA. B.J., Oct. 1999, at 40, 42; see also Jenna C. Newmark, The Lawyer's
"Prisoner's Dilemma".: Duty and Self-Defense in Postconviction Ineffectiveness Claims, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 699, 708 (2010).
19. See Lawrence J. Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful: Predecessor Counsel's
Ethical Duty to the CapitalDefendant, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1181, 1184 & n.23 (2003) [hereinafter
Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful].
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veterans in death penalty litigation, do provide important additional
information about existing practices, although without a systemic basis
for assessment.
This Article seeks a more complete understanding of attorney
compliance with their continuing obligations to former clients in capital
post-conviction litigation. To do so, it relies on research into a
phenomenon known as "motivated reasoning. '20 Now a mainstay of
academic study and of growing importance in legal scholarship,2 1 the
central idea is that people do not realize how unconsciously they seek
conclusions that favor their own wishes, wants, and desires. 22 By
applying this research to the continuing duties lawyers owe to their
former clients, the Article concludes that lawyers do not evaluate their
obligations objectively.23 Rather, the motivations that they possess will
be a significant factor in how they respond to the allegations.
This Article proceeds in three remaining parts. Part II
contextualizes the discussion by reviewing the obligations owed by
predecessor counsel to their former clients in death penalty cases, and
then assesses anecdotal evidence about whether these obligations are

20. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480
(1990) (explaining the concept of "motivated reasoning").
21. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Foreword:Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some
Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2011) (explaining motivated
reasoning and its application); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v.
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARv. L. REV. 837, 851-54 (2009) (discussing
theories that motivate cognition in fact perception); Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Resituating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1029-33 (2005) [hereinafter
Kim, The Banality of Fraud] (explaining the role of motivated reasoning for in-house counsel);
Sung Hui Kim, Naked Self-Interest? Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping, 63 FLA. L.
REV. 129, 137-39 (2011) [hereinafter Kim, Naked Self-Interest?] (discussing the importance of selfinterest in the legal profession); Michael Serota, PopularConstitutionalInterpretation,44 CONN. L.
REV. 1637, 1670-75 (2012) (explaining motivated reasoning relating to judicial decision-making);
Stephen A. Siegel, The Constitution on Trial: Article III's Jury Trial Provision, Originalism,and
the Problem of Motivated Reasoning, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 373, 444-46, 448-49 (2012)
(explaining motivated reasoning and illustrating its application).
22. See Eric G. Helzer & David Dunning, On Motivated Reasoning and Self-Belief in
HANDBOOK OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE 379, 379-80 (Simine Zavire & Timothy D. Wilson eds., 2012);
see also Roy Baumeister & Leonard Newman, Self-Regulation of Cognitive Inference and Decision
Processes,20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 3-19 (1994); Kunda, supra note 20, at 48081.
23. See infra Part III.A. For previous work on how unconscious biases, including the power of
motivated reasoning, influences the ethical judgments of criminal defense lawyers, see Tigran W.
Eldred, Prescriptionsfor Ethical Blindness: Improving Advocacy for Indigent Defendants in
Criminal Cases, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 340-44, 357-59 (2013) [hereinafter Eldred,
Prescriptions] (discussing the duty of criminal defense attorneys to investigate and the power of
ethical blindness); Tigran W. Eldred, The Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in CriminalCases, 58
U. KAN. L. REV. 43, 74-76 (2009) [hereinafter Eldred, Psychology of Conflicts] (discussing the
conflicts between a lawyer's self-interest and ethical obligations).
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being satisfied. 24 Part III turns to motivated reasoning, reviewing the
empirical basis for the conclusion that people engage in an unconscious
biased reasoning process that favors predetermined goals, and applies
the research to the decisions that lawyers make when facing claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.2 ' The ways that motivated reasoning
can be expected to influence compliance with the duties under Guideline
10.13 and related authority are also addressed in detail.26 Part IV
addresses the implications of the analysis, recommending ways to reduce
27
the power of the biased reasoning process.
II.

DUTIES AND PRACTICES OF PREDECESSOR COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY LITIGATION

A.

The Duties of PredecessorCounsel

This Subpart sketches the contours of the duties owed by lawyers
who can anticipate, and then are accused of, ineffective assistance of
counsel. Because others have discussed these matters in depth, there is
no need to recount every aspect of a lawyer's duty to a former client who
has brought a claim of ineffectiveness.28 Instead, this Subpart provides
an overview of those duties, highlighting the central obligations and
exploring their implications.
The starting point is Guideline 10.13, which details the duties of
predecessor counsel in capital cases and sets forth a chronological set of
obligations that begin before the original representation ends, and
continue through the completion of post-conviction proceedings.29
Guideline 10.13 reads:
In accordance with professional norms, all persons who are or have
been members of the defense team have a continuing duty to safeguard
the interests of the client and should cooperate fully with successor
counsel. This duty includes, but is not limited to:
A. maintaining the records of the case in a manner that will
inform successor counsel of all significant developments relevant to
the litigation;
B. providing the client's files, as well as information regarding all
aspects of the representation, to successor counsel;

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part Hl.
See infra Part IV.
See supra notes 16-17.
ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 8, Guideline 10.13, at 1074.
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C. sharing potential further areas of legal and factual research with
successor counsel; and
D. cooperating with such professionally
appropriate legal strategies
30
as may be chosen by successor counsel.

These duties derive from various sources, most notably the ethical rules
of the profession. 31 To start, the duty of competence requires that a
lawyer engage in representation that does not impair the ability of the
client to ensure, after the fact, that the representation received was
effective.32 This obligation, which comes from Rule 1.1 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"),3 3 imposes an obligation
on a lawyer during representation to maintain the client's file in a
manner that will allow the former client to determine what steps
predecessor counsel took, or did not take, during representation.3 4
In addition, all lawyers owe a duty to safeguard the interests of a
client to the extent reasonably practicable at the termination of the
attorney-client relationship under Model Rule 1.16 .35 At the very
minimum, this obligation requires surrender of the file to the client at the
end of the case. 36 In addition, coupled with the duty of competence, this
places an affirmative duty on predecessor counsel to assist successor
counsel in understanding the file's contents, including what is missing,

30. Id.
31. See Lawrence J. Fox, Capital Guidelines and Ethical Duties: Mutually Reinforcing
Responsibilities, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 775, 776, 794 (2008); Fox, Making the Last Chance

Meaningful, supra note 19, at 1185-91. See generally Siegel, My Reputation or Your Liberty, supra
note 1 (discussing the various ethical duties that serve as the basis for obligations of predecessor
counsel in death penalty cases).
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2013); Siegel, My Reputation or Your
Liberty, supra note 1, at 102.
33. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2013).

34. As Lawrence Fox has noted:
[T]he capital defense lawyer has an even heightened obligation beyond that in the run of
the mill matter, to maintain an orderly file, permitting anyone who follows to know what
steps the lawyer considered, what steps the lawyer took, what information was available,
what motions were contemplated, what motions were filed, what areas of inquiry and
research were suggested, which were pursued and which were rejected, who was
interviewed (and who was not), how jury selection was conducted, and every other
material step counsel undertook.
Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful, supra note 19, at 1189-90; see also Ellen Henak, When
the Interests of Self Clients, and Colleagues Collide: The Ethics of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claims, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 347, 358-60 (2009) (discussing criminal defense attorney
obligations); Siegel, My Reputation or Your Liberty, supra note 1, at 93-99 (discussing criminal
defense attorney obligations).
35.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16.

36. See id; Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful, supra note 19, at 1189; Siegel, My
Reputation or Your Liberty, supra note 1, at 112; Siegel, Three Questions, supra note 17, at 18.
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and when necessary, to help organize the file so that its contents can be
readily understood by successor counsel.37
The continuing duty of loyalty augments these responsibilities. In
particular, fidelity to the interests of a former client requires that
predecessor counsel do more than merely be honest and candid in
answering questions posed by successor counsel.38 It also requires that
the lawyer who is accused of ineffectiveness volunteer information
that
39
will assist the client's effort to prove the ineffectiveness claim.
Finally, predecessor counsel must take steps to protect against
unwarranted disclosure of confidential information obtained during
representation,40 which raises two related questions: first, to what extent
does the filing of an ineffectiveness claim waive the attorney-client
privilege, such that predecessor counsel can disclose, when compelled to
do so, communications with the client; and second, to what extent do the
rules of professional ethics permit predecessor counsel to volunteer
confidential information obtained during the representation? This latter
question concerns the duty to protect all information related to the
representation, whatever its source-an obligation that is much broader
than the limited disclosure that may be permissible when the attorneyclient privilege is waived. 4' Because Guideline 10.13 imposes upon
predecessor counsel the duty, "[i]n accordance with professional
norms... to safeguard the interests of the client," it plainly requires that
predecessor counsel's conduct with respect to these two issues comport
with the well-established body of doctrine governing them.42
1. The Attorney-Client Privilege
A lawyer who has been accused of ineffectiveness will often be one
of the most important witnesses in the formal judicial proceedings to
37. See Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful, supra note 19, at 1189-90.
38. Siegel, My Reputation or Your Liberty, supra note 1, at 105-08 (discussing the scope of
the duty of loyalty to a client).
39. See id. at 106-07. Of course, successor counsel should do everything reasonable to
facilitate this process. In particular, it will often be sound practice for successor counsel to reach out
to predecessor counsel prior to any court filing and seek to discuss interactively, as lawyers with
duties to a common client, the legal and factual basis, and the phrasing of the forthcoming
ineffectiveness claim with a view towards establishing a cooperative relationship. See id. Successor
counsel should also take the opportunity to remind predecessor counsel specifically of her
obligations regarding the continuing duty of client confidentiality. See id. at 109-10.
40. Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful, supra note 19, at 1186-87.
41.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2013); ABA Comm. on Ethics &

Prof l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456 (2010) (discussing the lawyer's disclosure of information
when a former client brings an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). The duty to protect former
client confidences is specifically set forth in Model Rule 1.9(c). See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.9(c); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456.
42. See ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 8, Guideline 10.13, at 1074.
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resolve the claim. 43 It is therefore critical to determine what information

counsel must reveal, for example, when responding to questions on the
witness stand, or when filing a court-ordered affidavit. The body of case
law that has developed to answer this question favors a limited waiver of
the attorney-client privilege, meaning that a lawyer can disclose only
information relating to the claims raised in the proceedings. 44 Most
courts describe the limited waiver as extending to any information that is
"relevant" to addressing the allegations of ineffectiveness, 45 although
some limit disclosure to what is "necessary" to resolve the claim.4 6 The
minority position, which is conceptually weaker, is that the filing of the
claim constitutes a full waiver of the privilege.4 7
43. See id Guideline 10.13 cmt., at 1075; Siegel, My Reputation or Your Liberty, supra note
1, at 90-91 ("While any criminal defense lawyer whose client is convicted is subject to the
possibility of a claim for ineffective assistance, lawyers in capital cases are virtually guaranteed
such claims.").
44. See Siegel, Withhold from the Prosecution, supra note 12, at 19, 23-24 nn.12-16 (citing
cases from the Fifth, Sixth, Eight, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as state cases and statutes).
45. See, e.g., Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1179 (1lth Cir. 2001) ("[A] habeas
petitioner alleging that his counsel made unreasonable strategic decisions waives any claim of
privilege over the contents of communications with counsel relevant to assessing the reasonableness
of those decisions in the circumstances." (emphasis added)); Alabama v. Lewis, 36 So. 3d 72, 77-78
(Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (noting that, by alleging "ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial
and direct appeal of these cases, the defendant waived the benefits of both the attorney-client
privilege and the work product privilege, but only with respect to matters relevant to his allegations
of ineffective assistance of counsel" (second emphasis added)); Waldrip v. Head, 532 S.E.2d 380,
387 (Ga. 2000) ("[W]e hold that a habeas petitioner who asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel makes a limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine and the
state is entitled only to counsel's documents and files relevant to the specific allegations of
ineffectiveness." (emphasis added)); In re Dean, 711 A.2d 257, 258-59 (N.H. 1998) ("We hold that
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether brought in a motion for new trial or in a habeas
corpus proceeding, constitute a waiver of the attomey-client privilege to the extent relevant to the
ineffectiveness claim; the waiver is a limited one." (emphasis added)).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 978 (10th Cir. 2009) ("[W]hen a habeas
petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel, he impliedly waives attorney-client privilege
with respect to communications with his attorney necessary to prove or disprove his claim."
(emphasis added)); Arizona v. Moreno, 625 P.2d 320, 323 (Ariz. 1981) ("The attorney may reveal
at least that much of what was previously privileged as is necessary to defend against the charges."
(emphasis added)).
47. See Siegel, Withholdfrom the Prosecution,supra note 12, at 19, 24 nn. 17-21 (citing cases
and state court rules that emphasize that the filing of an ineffective assistance claim constitutes a
broad waiver of the privilege). The dangers of a broad waiver rule were set forth forcefully by the
Ninth Circuit in Bittaker v. Woodford:
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are routinely raised in felony cases,
particularly when a sentence of death has been imposed. If the federal courts were to
require habeas petitioners to give up the privilege categorically and for all purposes,
attorneys representing criminal defendants in state court would have to worry constantly
about whether their casefiles and client conversations would someday fall into the hands
of the prosecution. In addition, they would have to consider the very real possibility that
they might be called to testify against their clients, not merely to defend their own
professional conduct, but to help secure a conviction on retrial. A broad waiver rule
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Regardless of the precise definition of the waiver, predecessor
counsel has an ethical duty to ensure that the former client's interests are
protected. For example, if the lawyer is asked about communications
that are outside the scope of the limited waiver in the case, the lawyer
must assert privilege in an effort to prevent unwarranted disclosure.4 8 In
addition, the lawyer must "interpose any other objections if there are
nonfrivolous grounds on which to do So.", 49 Further protective action
should be pursued, such as requesting that the court determine ex parte
and in camera whether any particular communication should be
disclosed, and seeking an appropriate protective order limiting
disclosure only to those who need it.5°
2. The Duty of Confidentiality
There is a related question, which often poses the most serious
problems: under what circumstances may predecessor counsel disclose
information that otherwise would be protected by the ethical duty of
confidentiality? 5 This question typically arises when there is an
informal request for information by the prosecutor, who may want to see
predecessor counsel's file or meet with predecessor counsel as part of
the investigation to prepare for, and respond to, the defendant's
allegations of ineffectiveness.5 2 Can predecessor counsel engage in such

would no doubt inhibit the kind of frank attorney-client communications and vigorous
investigation of all possible defenses that the attorney-client and work product privileges
are designed to promote.
331 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 2003); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 80(1)(b) & cmt. c (2000) ("A client who contends that a lawyer's assistance was
defective waives the privilege with respect to communications relevant to that contention."); ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456 (2010).
48.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 9 (2013).

49. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456. The ABA, in
response to a government subpoena or court order to turn over current and former client files,
concluded:
[A] lawyer has a professional responsibility to seek to limit the subpoena, or court order,
on any legitimate available grounds (such as the attorney-client privilege, work product
immunity, relevance or burden), so as to protect documents as to which the lawyer's
obligations under Rule 1.6 apply. Only if the lawyer's efforts are unsuccessful, either in
the trial court or in the appellate court ... and she is specifically ordered by the court to
turn over to the governmental agency documents which, in the lawyer's opinion, are
privileged, may the lawyer do so.
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof lResponsibility, Formal Op. 94-385 (1994).
50. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 19. For examples in which courts
have required in camera inspection of proposed disclosure or issued protective orders, see infra
notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
51.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 1.9(c).

52. See Siegel, Withholdfrom the Prosecution,supra note 12, at 23.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol42/iss2/5

10

Eldred: Motivation Matters: Guidelines 10.13 and Other Mechanisms for Pre

2013]

MOTIVATION MATTERS

informal interactions prior to formal judicial proceedings? Formal
Opinion 10-456 is directly on point.
The focus of Formal Opinion 10-456 is on the applicability of the
"self-defense" exception to confidentiality under Model Rule 1.6, which
permits disclosure of otherwise confidential information that the lawyer
determines is reasonably necessary to "respond to allegations in any
53
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.,
Recognizing that a lawyer may seek to justify disclosure under this
provision, Formal Opinion 10-456 recognizes that the provision "might
be read" to include claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 4 Even so,
Formal Opinion 10-456 concludes that disclosure is permitted only to
the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary under the
circumstances.55 In other words, every lawyer will need to carefully
scrutinize any potential disclosure to make sure that it is as narrow as
possible given the lawyer's need to respond to the allegations.56
More controversially, Formal Opinion 10-456 also concludes that
invoking the self-defense exception outside of court-supervised
proceedings-such as when the prosecution seeks information from
predecessor counsel before there has been a court order to do so-risks
unnecessary disclosure of confidential information because there will be
no judicial determination as to the propriety of the disclosure. 7
According to Formal Opinion 10-456, the potential harms that can flow
from such unwarranted disclosure are prejudice to the defendant in case
of a retrial and a chilling effect on future defendants from fully confiding
in their lawyers. 8 As a result, this Opinion concludes that it is "highly
unlikely that a disclosure in response to a prosecution request, prior
to a court-supervised response by way of testimony or otherwise, will
be justifiable. 59
Critics argue that Formal Opinion 10-456 unnecessarily restricts the
ability of predecessor counsel to disclose information to help the
prosecution determine whether there is any merit to the ineffectiveness

53. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 & cmts. 18-19; ABA Comm. on Ethics &
Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456. Formal Opinion 10-456 also notes that disclosure would
be permissible whenever the former client has provided informed consent, which does not occur
merely by the client's assertion of an ineffectiveness claim. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl
Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456.
54. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456.
55. See id.
56. See id. Formal Opinion 10-456 notes that this is functionally analogous to the ways that
courts interpret the self-defense exception to the attorney-client privilege. See id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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claim, which might prevent prosecutors from conceding error in some
cases, or properly defending claims in others.60 Critics also claim that
restricting disclosure to formal proceedings does not fully account for
the many ways that a finding of ineffectiveness might harm predecessor
counsel, including possible harm to the reputation of predecessor
counsel, increased risk of disciplinary sanction, and malpractice
exposure. 61 In a recent ethics opinion, the D.C. Bar Legal Ethics
Committee agreed that Formal Opinion 10-456 unnecessarily restricts
the circumstances under which disclosure is permissible.62
In contrast, supporters of Opinion 10-456 argue that, while there
may be some risks to limiting disclosure to judicially supervised
proceedings, on the whole, the approach taken by the Opinion 10-456 is
consistent with the ethical duties of the profession and the "developing
jurisprudence" on how courts approach prosecutorial requests for
information in ineffectiveness cases. 63 For example, some courts have
required supervision of any contemplated disclosure, including in some
instances, requiring that predecessor counsel submit any documents that
might be considered appropriate for disclosure to the court for in camera
review, while others have issued protective orders limiting the use of any
disclosures that occur. 64 In addition, some courts have directly approved

60. See Joy & McMunigal, supra note 12, at 44.
61. Id. For further discussion of these possible harms, see infra Part iI.B. 1.
62. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 364 (2013), available at http://www.dcbar.org/
bar-resources/legal-ethics/opinions/opinion364.cfn. While a detailed assessment of Opinion 364 is
beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting the cribbed and technical basis for its
conclusions. For example, Opinion 364 places significant emphasis on the fact that D.C. Rule of
Professional Conduct ("DCRPC") 1.6(e)(3)-which is the analog to the self-defense exception
under Model Rule 1.6(b)(5)-permits disclosure that responds only to "specific" allegations of
ineffectiveness, whereas Model Rule 1.6(e)(3) has no such limitation. Compare MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2013), with D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(e)(3) (2013), and
D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 364. Yet, this is a distinction without a difference. Both the
DCRPC and the Model Rules restrict disclosure to that which is "reasonably necessary" to respond
to the allegations. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6. It is hard to see how a lawyer who fails to follow this command would be magically
transformed into one who did fulfill the command simply because the DCRPC Rule requires the
disclosure to respond to "specific allegations," rather than just "allegations." See D.C. Bar Legal
Ethics Comm., Op. 364. Nor is there persuasive appeal to the fact that DCRPC does not require that
disclosure be in response to allegations "in any proceeding," as required under the Model Rules. See
id. The whole point of Formal Opinion 10-456 is that, without judicial supervision, there is too
much risk of lawyers disclosing more than is "reasonably necessary" to respond to allegations of
ineffectiveness, not that the language of Model Rule 1.6(e)(3) limits disclosure to allegations "in
any proceeding." See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456 (2010).
Fundamentally, Opinion 364 sidesteps this central question. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op.
364; supranotes 50-56 and accompanying text.
63. See Siegel, Withholdfrom the Prosecution,supra note 12, at 20.
64. Id at 21-22 (citing cases requiring supervision of contemplated disclosure).
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the conclusions of Formal Opinion 10-456,65 while others have noted
this Opinion is not binding on courts when determining the scope of the
attorney-client privilege.66
Fortunately, in deciding what her obligations are, predecessor
counsel in death penalty cases needs not parse these nuances.
Guideline 10.13.D specifically requires her to cooperate "with such
professionally appropriate legal strategies as may be chosen by
successor counsel. 67 If successor counsel, now representing the client,
advocates for the position advanced by Formal Opinion 10456,
predecessor counsel must behave accordingly.68
The final duty owed by predecessor counsel is uncontroversial.
Like any witness, a lawyer who testifies during a judicial proceeding
owes a duty to be truthful.69 In addition, lawyers also have independent
obligations of honesty and truthfulness. 70 As a result, if providing any
evidence during the case, a lawyer must be honest-particularly in
explaining the choices that the lawyer made during representation.
In sum, predecessor counsel owes to the former client who alleges
ineffectiveness a host of duties. Whether there is compliance, however,
is another question.

65. See, e.g., Talouzi v. United States, No. 3:12-CV-01687, 2012 WL 3778848, at *2 (S.D.
W. Va. Aug. 30, 2012) (noting that Formal Opinion 10-456 "provides a reasoned discussion of the
competing interests that arise in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and their
impact on the continued confidentiality of attorney-client communications"); Crusoe v. United
States, No. CR05-0071, 2012 WL 877018, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 15, 2012) (noting that Formal
Opinion 10-456 provides guidance, and ordering predecessor counsel to file an affidavit responding
to the allegations consistent with the Opinion); Giordano v. United States, No. 3:1 ICV9, 2011 WL
1831578, at *3 n.1 (D. Conn. Mar. 17, 2011) (noting that the policy, espoused by Formal Opinion
10-456, of limiting disclosure to formal judicial proceedings, "certainly would be a more foolproof
means to ensure that former counsel did not stray beyond the scope of their former clients'
ineffective assistance of counsel claims").
66. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, No. 4:1 1CV00702, 2012 WL 484663, at *2 (E.D. Mo.
Feb. 14, 2012) (noting the non-binding nature of Formal Opinion 10-456, but requiring predecessor
counsel to testify in court prior to disclosure of any information, and requiring in camera review of
any proposed disclosures prior to cross-examination); Dunlap v. United States, No. 4:09-cr-00854,
2011 WL 2693915, at *1 n.4 (D.S.C. July 12, 2011) (noting that Formal Opinion 10-456 is not
binding on courts considering the attorney-client privilege).
67. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 8, Guideline 10.13, at 1074.
68. See id. Guideline 10.13 cmt., at 1074 ("All members of the defense team
must.., facilitate the duty of successor counsel ....
").Successor counsel almost certainly has an
obligation to do precisely this, pursuant to Guideline 10.8, "The Duty to Assert Legal Claims." See
id. Guideline 10.8 & cmt., at 1028, 1032 (describing counsel's obligation to litigate all potentially
meritorious issues, even if precedent is currently adverse). Hence, predecessor counsel must assume
that successor counsel will object to any disclosure beyond the bounds of Formal Opinion 10-456,
and must act accordingly. See id
69. See MODEL RULES OF PRO'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2013).
70. See id. R. 8.4 (establishing that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to be dishonest).
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B. Assessing Practice:Do Lawyers Comply with Continuing
Duties Owed to Former Clients?
Determining whether lawyers who are accused of ineffectiveness
satisfy their continuing obligations to former clients is difficult. While a
number of recent cases have addressed some of these obligationsparticularly those that arise when prosecutors seek discovery from
predecessor counsel 7'-in the vast majority of ineffectiveness cases, the
conduct of predecessor counsel is not litigated. As a result, what is
known about compliance with the continuing duties is largely anecdotal,
coming from the handful of reported decisions on the topic and other
sources. In an effort to get a glimpse into these opaque practices, this
Subpart reviews what is known about how defense lawyers respond to
their duties set forth in Guideline 10.13 and related authority.
The duty of cooperation is the hardest to assess based on case law,
as the informal interactions between lawyers during habeas proceedings
are seldom reported. In rare instances, however, some mention of these
encounters can be found in the filings of a case. For example, in New
Jersey v. Loftin,72 where predecessor counsel was found ineffective for
allowing the probation department to interview the defendant while
capital murder charges were pending, successor counsel reported that
predecessor "met with representatives of the ...Prosecutor's Office on

approximately 6 separate occasions," yet "declined to speak" with
successor counsel, "who he termed '[his] adversary. '
Is this type of conduct common? Many experts think so. For
example, according to the former Chief Public Defender, who was
responsible for all death penalty litigation in Georgia:
Commonly, lawyers against whom [allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel] are raised react with disappointment, outrage,
and anger. When these feelings subside, the next usual response is to
develop a strategy to defend the allegations. Unfortunately, from that
point on, many attorneys facing a claim of ineffective assistance tend
to distance themselves from the former clients and even to create 74
an
adversarial relationship between themselves and their former clients.

71. See Siegel, Withhold from the Prosecution, supra note 12, at 20-22 (describing what
Siegel calls the "developing jurisprudence" of prosecutors who seek disclosure from predecessor
counsel, and citing cases and judicial responses to such inquiries); see also supra notes 51-52 and
accompanying text.
72. 922 A.2d 1210 (N.J. 2007).
73. Id.at 1227, 1229; State v. Loftin, No. 56,186, 2005 WL 6735278, at *8 n.2 (N.J. Sept. 19,
2005).
74. See Mears, supranote 18, at 42.
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Another veteran post-conviction lawyer, who has argued multiple cases
before the U.S. Supreme Court, concurs, noting: "Some lawyers whose
trial work is called into question won't even pick up the phone," and
refuse to respond to requests or inquiries until a copy of Formal Opinion
10-456 is mailed to them. 5 Other experts agree.76 Given the depth of
knowledge of these commentators, there is little doubt that many defense
lawyers accused of ineffectiveness respond defensively.
On the other hand, predecessor counsel has been known to
cooperate with successor counsel, at least to the extent of providing
factual information needed to support the ineffectiveness claim. For
example, during litigation that recently led to a successful claim of
ineffective assistance in Kansas v. Cheatham,77 the defendant's trial
lawyer provided a remarkable affidavit in which he conceded a litany of
errors, essentially admitting that he had been unprepared for virtually all
aspects of death penalty litigation.7 8 These errors included: his lack of
experience litigating capital murder cases; his failure to consult with or
seek assistance from more qualified attorneys; his failure to become
aware of the standards for capital litigation as set forth in the Guidelines;
his complete failure to investigate for either the guilt or penalty phase;
his failure to prepare a mitigation defense; and his agreement to
represent the defendant on a contingency fee basis.79 It is hard to
measure how often lawyers provide this type of cooperation; while there
have been instances in which lawyers have conceded error in death

75. See Lawrence Hurley, Second Guesses: When Criminal Defendants Attack Their Trial
Lawyers' Competence, CAL. LAW., Jan. 2012, at 45, 47.
76. See id. at 46 (quoting Professor Eric M. Freedman of Maurice A. Deane School of Law at
Hofstra University, the Reporter for the ABA Guidelines, who notes that it is the lawyers whose
representations are the most egregious, perhaps because of drug or alcohol abuse, who are "the most
likely to be defensive"); Joy & McMunigal, supra note 12, at 42 (noting that a "common reaction"
to being accused of ineffectiveness is "to be defensive and view the former client as an adversary").
Additionally, Fox explains:
[T]he conflict between predecessor counsel's obligation to help the former client and
inevitable reflex of predecessor counsel to wish to defend counsel's conduct. No one
wants to be accused of being ineffective. No one ever wants to be second-guessed.
Everyone wants to defend his or her conduct by asserting that it was in fact effective and
that the judgments that were made were defensible if not sound.
Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful, supra note 19, at 1185 (footnote omitted).
77. 292 P.3d 318 (Kan. 2013).
78. Id. at 323.
79. See Affidavit of Dennis Hawver, Cheatham, 292 P.3d 318 (No. 95,800).
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penalty cases,80 far more frequently no such concessions 8are made,
which indicates that they are the exception rather than the rule. 1
It is also difficult to make firm assessments regarding the other
obligations of cooperation-such as helping successor counsel
determine further areas of factual and legal inquiry to pursue, and
sharing the strategic thinking, or lack thereof, that preceded decisions
made during representation. Certainly, it would be fair to surmise that
most lawyers who react defensively to an allegation of ineffectiveness
do not turn around and become fully cooperative. Rather, the adversarial
posture that often develops between predecessor and successor counsel
suggests that little cooperation occurs. But again, little direct evidence is
available. After all, lawyers who avoid their professional obligations

rarely admit as much publically.
The related question is how frequently predecessor counsel
complies with the duty to safeguard the interests of their former clients,
for example, by refusing prosecutors' informal efforts to obtain
information about what transpired during the earlier case. Again, there is
conflicting information. On the one hand, some have suggested that
predecessor counsel rarely volunteer information to the prosecution
without a court order to do so, indicating that most lawyers continue to
protect confidential information from disclosure, even after a claim of
ineffectiveness has been filed 8 2 On the other hand, actual practices in

80. See, e.g., Walls v. Bowersox, 151 F.3d 827, 836 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting counsel's
admission of ineffective assistance); Harris v. Dugger, 874 F.3d 756, 761 (1lth Cir. 1989)
(describing counsel's admission that he failed to uncover witnesses who could have provided
mitigation evidence); Gentry v. Sinclair, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1153-54 & n.38 (W.D. Wash. 2008),
aff'd, 705 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting predecessor counsel's concession regarding his failure to
challenge the statistical reliability of DNA evidence admitted at trial); Commonwealth v. Carson,
913 A.2d 220, 265 (Pa. 2006) (describing an affidavit by counsel admitting ineffective assistance).
In one recent Supreme Court case, predecessor counsel provided a series of declarations that could
be interpreted, depending upon the point of view, as concessions or denials of error. See Cullen v.
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1423-24 (2011).
81. See Kyle Graham, Tactical Ineffective Assistance in Capital Trials, 57 AM. U. L. REV.
1645, 1675 n.171, 1684 n.208 (2008) (stating that "attorneys often candidly admit that they
rendered ineffective assistance in capital cases," but noting that there is often no affidavit from trial
counsel to provide any explanation, confessional or otherwise, for decisions made during
representation).
82. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456 (2010) ("[1]t is
highly unusual for a trial lawyer accused of providing ineffective representation to assist the
prosecution in advance of testifying or otherwise submitting evidence in a judicial
proceeding .... ). Formal Opinion 10-456 also notes: "In the generation since Strickland, the
normal practice has been that trial lawyers do not disclose client confidences to the prosecution
outside of court-supervised proceedings." Id. Indeed, there are instances in which defense lawyers
have refused, at least initially, to provide information to prosecutors. See, e.g., Crusoe v. United
States, No. CR05-0071, 2012 WL 877018, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 15, 2012) (noting that trial
counsel refused to cooperate with the prosecution's discovery requests in an ineffective assistance
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some jurisdictions suggest a very different result. For instance, one
federal judge recently noted that, in his district-one of the nation's
busiest-the common practice is for lawyers accused of ineffectiveness
to voluntarily provide prosecutors with affidavits responding to the
allegations, without either the formal consent of the defendant or a court
order to do so. 83 In other situations, lawyers have gone so far as to
voluntarily disclose their entire case files to the prosecution-again,
before any compulsion to do so. 8 4 Prosecutors have been known to work
closely with predecessor counsel; for example, as in Loftin, by helping
predecessor counsel prepare for their post-conviction testimony-hardly
the type of conduct meant to protect the interests of the former client
who has alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Whether these cases
are outliers is, again, hard to determine from available evidence.
case, absent a court order directing trial counsel to provide an affidavit responding to the
allegations); Wadford v. United States, No. 2:06-cr-01294, 2011 WL 3489808, at *2, 4 (D.S.C.
Aug. 9, 2011) (discussing trial counsel's affidavit detailing his representation, which was filed after
a court ordered an evidentiary hearing on ineffectiveness claims); United States v. Rankin, No.
5:09CR00013, 2010 WL 5478472, at *2 n.3 (W.D. W. Va. Dec. 30, 2010) (noting that defense
counsel refused to volunteer an affidavit to the prosecution); State v. Cantrell, 2011 Ark. 449, 449
(explaining that trial counsel can only provide information if the former client waives the attorneyclient privilege); State v. Buckner, 527 S.E.2d 307, 310 (N.C. 2000) (noting that trial counsel
refused to speak to the prosecution regarding his former client's claims of ineffective assistance).
83. See Douglas v. United States, No. 09 CV 9566, 2011 WL 335861, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
28, 2011). According to Judge Colleen McMahon, this practice arises out of the belief that, because
the filing of an ineffectiveness claim constitutes a limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege,
"[flormal consent" from the former client is "deemed unnecessary," and a court order requiring
disclosure is "guaranteed to issue." Id. The fallacy of this reasoning is that it erroneously conflates
the duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. To be sure, by bringing the claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel, the former client implicitly waives any privilege he may assert to
prevent compelled disclosure of pertinent information. But, this says nothing about whether the
former client has also consented to the disclosure, prior to a court order, of otherwise confidential
information under Model Rule 1.6. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2013); ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456.
84. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, No. 4:11CV00702, 2012 WL 484663, at *2 (E.D. Mo.
Feb. 14, 2012) (considering whether the prosecution could review the trial file relinquished by trial
defense counsel in preparation for an ineffectiveness hearing); Binney v. State, 683 S.E.2d 478,
479-80 (S.C. 2009) (discussing whether voluntary disclosure of entire case file to the prosecution
violated a state statute defining the attorney-client privilege). It is hard to imagine how such blanket
disclosure, prior to formal judicial proceedings, comports with the ethical restrictions of Model Rule
1.6, when the "self-defense" exception limits voluntary disclosures to only information that is
reasonably necessary for the lawyer to respond to the allegations. See discussion supraPart II.A. To
be sure, broad claims of ineffectiveness may require extensive disclosure, but full disclosure of the
entire file-which, no doubt, will always contain information unrelated to the substance of
ineffectiveness allegations-is difficult to explain.
85. See New Jersey v. Loftin, No. 56,186, 2005 WL 6735278, at *8 (N.J. Sept. 19, 2005);
Bane v. Tennessee, No. W2009-01653-CCA-R3, slip op. at 29-30 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 21, 2011)
(quoting trial counsel's testimony from the post-conviction hearing where counsel acknowledged
that he depended on the Assistant District Attorney General to review his testimony and to help him
prepare for the hearing).
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Delving deeper, determining how predecessor counsel responds
once there is a court order requiring disclosure to the prosecution is also
difficult. Purkey is one of the few reported decisions where predecessor
counsel's response to a court order for disclosure itself became the
subject of additional litigation.86 More frequently, once a court orders
predecessor counsel to provide the prosecution with information relating
to the allegations, the record of how predecessor counsel responds
becomes silent. Do lawyers continue to safeguard the interests of their
former clients by narrowly tailoring their responses to ensure that only
information needed to resolve the ineffectiveness claim is disclosed, or
do they open the floodgates of their files after a court order and provide
the prosecution with whatever is requested, as alleged in Purkey?87 How
frequently does predecessor counsel attempt to limit disclosure in other
ways-for example, by asserting as required non-frivolous claims of
privilege; seeking an in camera and ex parte review by the court of
proposed disclosures; or seeking protective orders to limit unwarranted
disclosure?8 8 Is the advocacy-style affidavit filed by predecessor counsel
in the Purkey case unique, or do other lawyers accused of ineffectiveness
respond similarly? Answers to these questions are unknown.
Last, do lawyers in death penalty cases maintain their files in a
manner that meets the obligations set forth in Guideline 10.13?
Although, again, little is known empirically, here a bit more may be
sumised with confidence. Given the pervasive problem of poor-quality
representation in death penalty cases, 89 and the burdens of limited
resources under which so many lawyers operate, it would hardly
be surprising if predecessor counsel's files were frequently incomplete
and inaccurate. 90
86. See Purkey v. United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W, 2010 WL 4386532, at *1 (W.D. Mo.
Oct. 28, 2010); see also State v. Buckner, 527 S.E.2d 307, 310 (N.C. 2000) (finding that
predecessor counsel had acted properly when, in response to court ordered disclosure, he agreed to
disclose correspondence with the defendant, but refused to speak directly with the prosecutor).
87. See discussion supraPart II.A.2.
88. See supranotes 62-64 and accompanying text.
89. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE Is So MUCH
ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 41 (2002), available at

http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf (finding that thirty-nine percent of death
sentence reversals in state post-conviction proceedings, and twenty-seven percent of federal
reversals, were due to "egregiously incompetent lawyering"). See generally WELSH S. WHITE,
LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN CAPITAL CASES (2006)

(describing deeply flawed lawyering provided to many capital defendants); Stephen B. Bright,
Counselfor the Poor: The Death Sentence Notfor the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103
YALE L.J. 1835 (1994) (emphasizing the inadequate representation provided to many capital
defendants).
90. Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful, supra note 19, at 1190-91 (discussing the
possibility that "beleaguered counsel, underpaid and understaffed," would not maintain files "in a
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Take, for example, the Supreme Court's recent decision concerning
the quality of the mitigation investigation in Wood v. Allen.91 Wood
turned on whether the defendant's three trial lawyers made a "strategic"
decision to stop investigating-and to present no evidence at sentencing
about-the defendant's mental health deficiencies after receiving a
psychological report regarding his competency to stand trial.92 In
deciding that there was sufficient evidence to support the state court's
factual determination that the decision was strategic, the Court cited
contemporaneous correspondence between the lawyers, which included
a statement by the lead lawyer that the psychologist's report merited no
further investigation.9 3 At first blush, this case might suggest that
predecessor counsel kept the type of records contemplated by Guideline
10.13. In fact, the opposite is true. None of the correspondence, nor any
other contemporaneous documentation in the record, explains why, after
reviewing the psychologist's report, the lead lawyer decided that no
further investigation was needed. Was it because there was nothing in
the report suggesting any further line of inquiry? Was it because the
report was so complete and thorough that no further investigation was
reasonably warranted? Or, was it some other reason? These questions
are hardly academic; other testimony in the post-conviction proceeding
demonstrated that the defendant's mental health deficiencies placed him
at or near the borderline for retardation.9 4 Had there been additional
documentation explaining the decisions of the defense team, a much
fuller record would have been available to help the Court render its
judgment. And, while it is mere conjecture at this point, one can wonder

pristine condition").
91. 558 U.S. 290 (2010).
92. See id.at 299, 301-03. The Supreme Court sidestepped the primary issue upon which it
had granted certiorari-namely, to determine the relationship between two provisions of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 relating to federal court review of state court
factual findings. Wood, 558 U.S. at 293; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). As a result, the Court
limited its inquiry to whether, under § 2254(d)(2), the state court's finding that predecessor counsel
made a strategic decision not to pursue or present evidence of the defendant's mental deficiencies
was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court
proceedings. See Wood, 558 U.S. at 299, 301-03.
93. Wood, 558 U.S. at 301-02. The letters were written by Kenneth Trotter, a young,
inexperienced lawyer who was primarily responsible for the sentencing phase and who answered to
the other two lawyers: lead counsel, Cary Dozier, and Frank Ralph. See Joint Appendix at 342-45,
Wood, 558 U.S. 290 (No. 08-9156). In both letters, Trotter made the same statement: "We have not
had an independent psychological evaluation done since [Dozier] said it would not be needed. As
you know, in discovery materials [we learned the defendant] had anger control problems and
demonstrated antisocial behavior. Based on this information, we should request an independent
psychological evaluation [of the defendant]." Id.No such independent psychological evaluation was
ever requested or conducted. Id.
94. See Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1286 (1 1th Cir. 2008).
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whether such records would have furnished the evidence needed
to
95
prove that predecessor counsel's representation was ineffective.
In sum, the available empirical evidence provides a partial
understanding of how lawyers anticipate, and respond to, claims of
ineffectiveness in death penalty cases, although, what is known is largely
anecdotal and incomplete. While some lawyers appear to be willing and
able to comply with their duties to an extent, a defensive response is
triggered in many other lawyers upon learning of a former client's
ineffectiveness claim, and such responses can undermine the
professional duties owed to these clients. Because anecdotal evidence
only goes so far to help assess how lawyers prepare for, and respond to,
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, empirical evidence is needed.
The question is whether a more systematic approach to determining
lawyer behavior is available.
III.

THE POWER OF MOTIVATED REASONING

This Part takes up the task of assessing attorney behavior by
focusing on one of the most studied and robust psychological factors that
contribute to human reasoning and decision-making: the power of
motivation. Often known as "motivated reasoning" or "motivated
cognition," it is now well established that people reason in a way that is
biased by their pre-existing wishes, wants, and desires.96
A.

Foundations ofMotivated Reasoning

A core finding of research into the psychology of decision-making
is that motivation powerfully influences judgment and behavior. 97 As
one set of experts explained:
95. At least two possible legal consequences might have flowed from a fuller explanation of
why predecessor counsel decided to end the investigation after receiving the psychologist's report.
First, it may have demonstrated that, as a factual matter, the decision by predecessor counsel was
not strategic. Alternatively, it may have demonstrated to the lower courts that, even if strategic,
counsel's decision was not reasonable. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000) (noting
that the relevant question for Strickland analysis "is not whether counsel's choices were strategic,
but whether they were reasonable").
96. See Baumeister & Newman, supra note 22, at 3-19; Helzer & Dunning, supra note 22, at
380-81; Kunda, supranote 20, at 480, 489-95.
97. Much has been written about the relationship between cognitive and motivational aspects
of reasoning and judgment, including evidence demonstrating the importance of both in the
decision-making process. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 223-33
(2000); Kunda, supra note 20, at 482, 488; Tom Pyszczynski & Jeff Greenberg, Toward an
Integrationof Cognitive and Motivational Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased HypothesisTesting Model, 20 ADVANCES INEXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 297, 297-98 (1987). The emphasis
of this Article is on the motivational components, although other aspects are discussed as
appropriate. See supra Part 1.
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A wealth of social psychological research suggests that in many
judgment situations, particularly those that involve people and issues
we care about deeply, people ...often have a preference for reaching
one conclusion over another, and these directional motivations serve98to
tip judgment processes in favor of whatever conclusion is preferred.

Moreover, motivated cognition occurs through automatic processes, that
is, below the level of conscious awareness. 99 The result is that people are
able to continue comfortably believing the illusion of their own
objectivity, unaware of how their wishes and desires are coloring
the decisions they make.' 0 0 Put succinctly, they are blinded to their
own biases.' 0 '
The robust empirical basis for motivated reasoning has been well
documented. 10 2 Indeed, "[p]sychologists now have file cabinets full of
findings on 'motivated reasoning,' showing the many tricks people use
to reach the conclusions they want to reach."'' 0 3 Any casual search for
information will produce a vast array of empirical and theoretical studies
on motivated reasoning. For instance, studies have demonstrated that
people consider information that is consistent with their desires-such
98. Peter H. Ditto et al., Motivated Moral Reasoning, in 50 PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND
MOTIVATION 307, 310 (2009) (citations omitted).
99. See id. at 311 (describing the "affective reactions" that underlie motivated reasoning as
"quick, automatic, and ubiquitous"); Pyszczynski & Greenberg, supra note 97, at 302, 311; see also
DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 361 n.100 (2012)
(listing sources discussing motivated reasoning).
100. Ditto et al., supra note 98, at 312 ("The crucial aspect of... motivated reasoning
mechanisms is that their subtlety allows them to operate well within the confines of what people
perceive as the dictates of objectivity."); Kunda, supra note 20, at 483 (describing how people
maintain an illusion of objectivity by not being aware that their reasoning process is biased by their
goals); Pyszczynski & Greenberg, supranote 97, at 302 (describing the illusion of objectivity).
101. See, e.g., Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering into the Bias Blind Spot: People's Assessments of
Bias in Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 680, 681 (2005); Emily
Pronin, The IntrospectionIllusion, in 41 ADVANCES INEXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 6-7
(2009); Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 369 (2002); see also MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E.
TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO WHAT'S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 5

(2011) (describing ethical blind spots). For a description of how the illusion of objectivity
influences criminal defense lawyers who represent indigent defendants, see Eldred, Prescriptions,
supranote 23, at 358 & nn.149-51.
102. Erica Dawson et al., Motivated Reasoning and Performanceon the Wason Selection Task,
28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1379, 1379 (2002) ("There is now a great deal of
evidence that people are inclined to draw conclusions that suggest positive outcomes for
themselves; provide support for pre-existing opinions; and confirm their status, success, and wellbeing."); Paul D. Windschitl et al., Why So Confident? The Influence of Outcome Desirability on
Selective Exposure and Likelihood Judgment, 120 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 73, 73-74 (2013).
103. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY
POLITICS AND RELIGION 98 (2012).
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as, when addressing one's intelligence or professional competencemore valid than information that is inconsistent with them. 1 4 Other
studies have demonstrated motivated responses in how people assess the
performance of preferred presidential officeholders, 10 5 the sportsmanship
1°6
of their preferred sporting team, and even the odds of winning a bet. 107
Take, for example, the long-studied area of motivated political
reasoning. While it would hardly be surprising to learn that political
zealots can be blinded by partisan ideology, research demonstrates that
motivational goals that bias political reasoning are lurking below the
surface of consciousness for most people--even those with only
moderate political beliefs.108 Indeed, even when instructed to be
accurate, people's motivations seems to reign, demonstrating "consistent
evidence of directional partisan bias" which may make it "impossible to
be fair-minded."' 0 9 In one study, researchers found that political identity
influenced views about the propriety of the United States' intervention in
Iraq: Democrats persistently concluded that the absence of weapons of
mass destruction was evidence that they never existed, whereas
Republicans interpreted the same data as proof that the weapons had
been moved, hidden, or destroyed.110 As is often the case with motivated
reasoners, the same information-here, the absence of weapons-was
interpreted in a biased manner to help justify pre-existing beliefs and
desires about the propriety of the United States' military campaign." 1
2
Other studies have come to similar results."
104. See Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential Decision
Criteriafor Preferredand Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 568,
569 (1992); see also SIMON, supra note 99, at 25-26.

105.

Matthew J. Lebo & Daniel Cassino, The Aggregated Consequences of Motivated

Reasoning and the Dynamics of PartisanPresidential Approval, 28 POL. PSYCHOL. 719, 720
(2007).

106. Albert Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 129-34 (1954).
107. See SIMON, supra note 99, at 26.
108. Charles S. Taber & Milton Lodge, Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political
Beliefs, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 755, 767 (2006).

109. Id. (discussing a study that "presents a compelling case that motivated biases come to the
fore in the processing of political arguments even for nonzealots").
110. See Brian J. Gaines et al., Same Facts, Different Interpretations:PartisanMotivation and

Opinion on Iraq, 69 J. POL. 957, 958 (2007). Similarly, in another study, researchers found that the
partisanship of participants-who were shown television coverage of the Israeli-Arab conflictdetermined the direction of the media bias that the participants perceived. See Robert P. Vallone et
al., The Hostile Media Phenomenon: BiasedPerceptionand Perceptionsof Media Bias in Coverage
of the Beirut Massacre, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 577, 581 (1985).

111. See Gaines et al., supra note 110, at 958.
112. See Charles S. Taber et al., The Motivated Processing of Political Arguments, 31 POL.
BEHAV. 137, 139 (2009) (finding that people engage in various mechanisms of motivated reasoning
to denigrate evidence that is inconsistent with their pre-existing political beliefs).
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This type of biased assimilation of information is an example of the
larger phenomenon that lies at the heart of motivated reasoning.
Sometimes called "asymmetrical skepticism,"'" 13 the central idea is that
people subject information that is consistent with preferences to less
scrutiny than they do to information that contradicts a preferred
outcome."14 This is particularly true when there is a vested personal
interest in the belief." 5 The specific manifestations occur in various
ways. For example, considerable evidence indicates that people frame
questions in ways that favor their beliefs; 1 6 search their memory and
other sources for favorable information and then truncate their search
once it is found; 1 7 tend to perceive ambiguous information in a manner
that is consistent with preferences;' 18 and evaluate favorable information
less rigorously than unfavorable information. " 9 An apt description of the
phenomena is that motivated reasoners, when confronted with favorable
information, ask the permissive question: "Can I believe this?"whereas, when confronted with hostile or unfavorable information, they
ask a more demanding' 20question that imposes a greater level of scrutiny:
"Must I believe this?"'
113. Karl Ask et al., Elasticity in Evaluations of Criminal Evidence: Exploring the Role of
Cognitive Dissonance, 16 LEGAL CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 289, 290 (2011) [hereinafter Ask et
al., Elasticity in Evaluations] (citing extensive studies of this effect, also known as the "Quantity of
Information Processing" effect); Karl Ask & Pfir Anders Granhag, Motivational Bias in Criminal
Investigators'Judgmentsof Witness Reliability, 37 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 561, 579 (2007). For
a review of the literature in this area, see Antony Page, UnconsciousBias and the Limits of Director
Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 269-76 (discussing the influence of motivational biases).
114. See Ask et al., Elasticity in Evaluations,supra note 113, at 290.
115. See Ask & Granhag, supra note 113, at 562, 579 (discussing the subjectivity of witness
interpretation of information in criminal investigations).
116. See Helzer & Dunning, supra note 22, at 381 ("One of the most powerful-and subtlestrategies people can use to arrive at desired conclusions is to frame the questions they ask in a
biased manner, making confirmation of a desired conclusion more likely than disconfirmation.");
see also SIMON, supra note 99, at 37.
117. See Dawson et al., supra note 102, at 1379. In the article Motivated Recruitment of
AutobiographicalMemories, Rasyid Sanitioso and his colleagues stated:
People attempt to construct a rational justification for the conclusions that they want to
draw. To that end, they search through memory for relevant information, but the search
is biased in favor of information that is consistent with the desired conclusions. If they
succeed in finding a preponderance of such consistent information, they are able to draw
the desired conclusion while maintaining an illusion of objectivity.
Rasyid Sanitioso et al., Motivated Recruitment of AutobiographicalMemories, 59 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 229, 229 (1990).
118. See Ditto etal., supra note 98, at 311.
119. Ditto & Lopez, supranote 104, at 569-70.
120. Dawson et al., supra note 102, at 1379; see also THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNOW
WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLIBILITY OF HuMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 31-37 (1991); Helzer &
Dunning, supra note 22, at 382 (describing studies that support findings of "motivated skepticism").
In one classic study of particular pertinence, researchers found that participants' pre-existing beliefs
about capital punishment determined how they perceived studies on its deterrent effects. See
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The power of motivation, however, is not unconstrained. Rather,
competing with the desire for a preferred conclusion is the motive for
accuracy, which moderates the power of wishful reasoning. 121 Basically,
people tend not to bend the rules of reason to achieve implausible
conclusions. 122 It is situations of ambiguity where, because there is more
room for biased selection and interpretation of information, motivated
reasoning can flourish. 123 In contrast, when there is little ambiguity and
the conclusion to be reached is clear-cut,
the power of motivated
124
reasoning is substantially diminished.
The role of ambiguity is well documented. For example, a large
body of research demonstrates what is known as the "above average
effect," in which people persistently rate themselves as above average in
a variety of ways, such as driving a car, managerial prowess,
productivity, and other desirable traits.1 25 The ability to make such selfserving assessments is constrained by the elasticity of the trait. 126 To list
just a few examples: athletes asked to rate their capabilities are more
likely to exaggerate their abilities regarding ambiguous characteristicssuch as mental toughness-than less ambiguous traits, such as running
speed; 27 people are more likely to consider themselves
environmentalists when asked about general traits that are easily
manipulated than when asked about more objective criteria-such as

Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization:The Effects of PriorTheories
on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2100 (1979).
For example, those opposed to capital punishment were more likely to question the methodology of
a study that demonstrated its deterrent effect than were those who favored the death penalty. Id. In
short, participants were more suspicious of data they did not want to believe. Id.
121. Kunda, supranote 20, at 481-82.
122. Ditto et al., supra note 98, at 314 ("People only bend data and the laws of logic to the
point that normative considerations challenge their view of themselves as fair and objective judges,
and motivated reasoning effects are most pronounced in situations where plausibility constraints are
loose and ambiguous."); Kunda, supranote 20, at 491 ("[lf directional goals do exert an influence
on reasoning, this influence is limited by people's perceptions of reality and plausibility."). But see
Helzer & Dunning, supra note 22, at 385-92 (arguing that the research on plausibility constraints
may need to be updated to take into account instances where motivated reasoning occurs despite the
implausibility of the conclusion reached).
123. See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining BargainingImpasse: The Role of
Self-Serving Biases, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1997, at 109, 111 (citing studies that demonstrate that
"self-serving assessments of fairness are likely to occur in morally ambiguous settings").
124. See Dolly Chugh et al., Bounded Ethicality as a PsychologicalBarrier to Recognizing
Conflicts ofInterest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS LAW,

MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 74, 82 (Don A. Moore et al. eds., 2005).

125. See Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 123, at 110-11.
126. See id.
127. Scott T. Allison & Dafha Eylon, Ambiguity as Friend or Foe: The Use of Ambiguous
Information in the Self-Serving Achievement of Task Goals, 8 CURRENT RES. SOC. PSYCHOL. 253,
254 (2003).
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whether they recycle, donate to environmental organizations, or use
energy-saving light bulbs, all of which can be verified;128 and college
students produce more flattering self-reports the more ambiguous the
trait-whether desirable or not.12 9 As one noted expert has stated: "one
of the royal roads to constructing a pleasant and congenial self-image is
the constant exploitation of ambiguity and uncertainty."' 30
Given the powerful psychological influence of motivated reasoning,
it is not surprising that it has permeated considerations about the
criminal justice process. For instance, significant attention has focused
on how police and others in law enforcement too often narrowly seek to
prove that an identified suspect committed a crime, rather than
objectively evaluating available evidence. 131 Central to these inquiries
are the motivations at play. 132 The pressure to clear cases, the
professional pride generated by helping make an arrest, and the prestige
that can follow from a successful prosecution are only some of the
motivations that can 1cause
asymmetric skepticism of evidence
33
uncovered during a case.
Prosecutors also can experience motivated reasoning as part of the
34
cluster of psychological biases that can produce erroneous judgments. 1
For example, as a number of legal scholars have demonstrated, part of
the explanation for prosecutorial misconduct-such as the failure to
meet Brady obligations or to properly respond to post-conviction claims
128.

Chugh et al., supra note 124, at 82.

129.

See DAVID DUNNING, SELF-INSIGHT: ROADBLOCKS AND DETOURS ON THE PATH TO
KNOWING THYSELF 102-03 (2005).

130. Id. at 99; see also Kim, The Banality of Fraud,supra note 21, at 1030 ("[C]omplex and
ambiguous contexts.., where multiple arguments can be generated are ideal environments for
triggering self-serving biases, because they allow subjects to focus on, or weight, differentially,
arguments favoring themselves (or their clients or de facto principals) over other parties.").
131. See Ask & Granhag, supra note 113, at 561-62; Deborah Davis & Richard A. Leo, To
Walk in Their Shoes: The Problem of Missing, Misunderstood, and Misrepresented Context in
JudgingCriminal Confessions, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 737, 738-39 (2012).
132. See SIMON, supra note 99, at 25-33 (discussing comprehensive research demonstrating
how motivated reasoning can bias the investigation of a criminal case); Ask & Granhag, supra note
113, at 579 (reporting that research demonstrates that investigators engage in asymmetric skepticism
when considering evidence regarding an identified suspect); Davis & Leo, supra note 131, at 76465 (discussing the role that motivated reasoning can play in producing false confessions during the
investigation of crime).
133. SIMON, supra note 99, at 26-27. Other motivations that can skew the investigatory process
include the emotional arousal of police-especially anger and disgust-toward a particular suspect,
the affinity of group membership, and the escalation of commitment to the guilt of a suspect who
has been identified on preliminary evidence gathered in the case. See id.
134. See id.
at 20 (noting that much of the psychological phenomena that influence police and
others in law enforcement also affect prosecutors, "who are often involved in one way or another in
major investigations, and who are subjected to similar incentives and pressures in the performance
of their role").
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of innocence-rests with motivated reasoning.1 35 The central argument
of these scholars is that, once a person has been accused of a crime,
the unconscious
need to confirm the accused's guilt overrides concerns
136
for accuracy,
Finally, defense lawyers are not immune from these psychological
forces, especially in circumstances of extreme workload pressure. 137 The
result can be a form of what I call "ethical blindness," which causes
defense lawyers who are motivated to dispose of cases quickly to
shortchange their professional obligations. 13 Again, these motivations
that bias judgment-just as with police and prosecutors-occur below
the level of consciousness, meaning they go undetected, leaving their
mark without a trace.
B. PredecessorCounsel as Motivated Reasoner
The research on motivated reasoning helps to provide an accurate
picture of how lawyers will respond when faced with allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Of course, no one motive will exist for
all lawyers.1 39 Many lawyers will react defensively to a claim of
ineffectiveness, believing that the allegation is an unwarranted assault
against their competence and good name. Some may view the claim with
less hostility, recognizing that accusations of ineffectiveness should be
135. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88-90 (1963); see, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improvising
ProsecutorialDecision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1587, 1597-98 (2006) (discussing the influence of motivational factors on selective information
processing); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
CriminalCases, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 291, 313 (discussing motivational factors). Most of the work on
prosecutorial error has focused on the cognitive aspects ofjudgment bias, particularly with regard to
the role of "confirmation bias," which is the well-documented psychological phenomenon in which
people unconsciously seek out information that confirms pre-existing beliefs or opinions. Burke,
supra, at 1596. However, the long debate in psychology over differentiating cognitive and
motivational aspects of reasoning is well beyond the present purposes, other than to note that the
cognitive processes that produce confirmation bias and the goal directed aspects of motivational
reasoning tend to work together. See, e.g., Kunda, supra note 20, at 494-95. Indeed, psychologists
have found that motivated reasoning will often be responsible for the initial hypothesis that starts
the process of confirmatory reasoning. Id. In other words, confirmation bias describes one
mechanism by which motivated reasoning occurs. For a discussion that brings together the cognitive
and motivational factors in prosecutorial decision-making, see Barbara O'Brien, A Recipefor Bias:
An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in
ProsecutorialDecisionMaking, 74 MO. L. REV. 999, 1010-15 (2009).
136. See Findley & Scott, supra note 135, at 292-93.
137.

See AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: How AMERICA HOLDS COURT 4 (2009); Eldred,

Prescriptions,supra note 23, at 337-40; Findley & Scott, supranote 135, at 292.
138. See Eldred, Prescriptions,supranote 23, at 368-74.
139. See Susan Bandes, Repression andDenial in Criminal Lawyering, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
339, 358 (2006) [hereinafter Bandes, Repression and Denial] (describing the vagaries of motives
that exist for death penalty litigators).
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expected, especially in death penalty cases. There may even be a few
lawyers who, being so committed to their client's interest, view an
allegation of ineffectiveness as a welcome opportunity to prevent or
delay the client's execution. The next Subpart surveys these various
motives, and examines how they can be expected to influence decisions
lawyers make regarding their professional duties under Guideline 10.13
and other relevant authority.140
1. Lawyers Motivated to Resist Allegations of Ineffectiveness
For defense lawyers who are accused of ineffective assistance of
counsel, two motives are likely to take priority. The first concerns the
role of emotion. Contrary to common perception, people cannot simply
disregard their emotional reactions when making a decision. Rather, it is
the experience of emotion that produces an immediate motivated
response.1 41 In other words, motivated reasoning is emotion-based
reasoning, 142 which occurs automatically, effortlessly, and without
awareness. 143 And, while the role of emotion continues to be studied in a
wide range of disciplines,' 44 its role as a 4significant
factor in how
5
decisions are made is now firmly established. 1
It is also understood that lawyers frequently react defensively to
allegations of ineffectiveness. 146 They may feel scorned, angry,' 147 and as
140. See infra Part IlI.B.1-2.
141. See Ditto et al., supra note 98, at 311; Drew Westen et al., Neural Bases of Motivated
Reasoning: An fMRI Study of Emotional Constraints on Partisan PoliticalJudgment in the 2004
U.S. PresidentialElection, 18 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1947, 1947 (2006).

142. See Drew Westen & Pavel S. Blagov, A Clinical-EmpiricalModel of Emotion Regulation,
in HANDBOOK OF EMOTION REGULATION 373, 382 (2007) (describing how the "emotional influence
on judgment and decision making occurs in a phenomenon known as motivated reasoning, whereby
people draw emotionally biased conclusions"); see also Ditto et al., supra note 98, at 311 ("[A]s
people consider information relevant to a judgment where they have a preferred conclusion, they
experience positive affect if that information seems to support their preferred conclusion, and
negative affect if it seems to challenge their preferred conclusion."); Westen et al., supra note 141,
at 1947 ("Motivated reasoning can be viewed as a form of implicit affect regulation in which the
brain converges on solutions that minimize negative and maximize positive affect states.").
143. Ditto et al., supra note 98, at 311; Lisa Feldman Barrett et al., On the Automaticity of
Emotion, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE AUTOMATICITY OF HIGHER
MENTAL PROCESSES 173, 187-91 (2007).

144. Susan A. Bandes, Repellent Crimes and Rational Deliberation: Emotion and the Death
Penalty, 33 VT. L. REv. 489, 506 (2009) [hereinafter Bandes, Repellent Crimes] (describing how a
wide range of fields, "including philosophy, psychology, sociology, political science, anthropology,
and cognitive neuroscience, hold pieces of the puzzle about what emotion is and what roles it
plays").
145. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text; see also Taber & Lodge, supra note 108,
at 756 (arguing that, based on research, "selective biases and polarization... are triggered by an
initial (and uncontrolled) affective response").
146. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
147. See Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful, supra note 19, at 1185.
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if their pride is wounded.148 Perhaps they perceive the allegation as an
attack on their self-worth, 149 or as an unwarranted attack on their
competence, from an ungrateful former client.1 50 Whatever the cause,
lawyers who experience such negative reactions can be expected to
engage in biased selection, recall, and interpretation of information.
Coupled with the emotionally charged environment of capital litigation
itself, which can be deeply draining and is so often infused with strong
passions about the death penalty, 15 1 the power of these emotional
reactions to produce motivated responses can be anticipated to be
especially strong.
The power of self-interest is also a significant component of the
decision-making process. It should surprise no one that self-interested
goals are often consciously pursued. But, the more subtle point here is
that self-interest also influences decisions automatically, outside of the
conscious awareness of the decision-maker. 52 Indeed, a wealth of
psychological data indicates that people engage in biased reasoning to
achieve self-interested results.1'5 The result is that they fail to perceive
the ways in which self-interest corrupts their choices. 54 Lawyers and

148. Siegel, M* Reputation or Your Liberty, supra note 1, at 99-100.
149. Chugh et al., supra note 124, at 84-85 (noting that people possess an illusion of their own
competence to maintain and protect their self-esteem); see also SIMON, supra note 99, at 110
(describing how memory can be influenced by the "ubiquitous need to enhance one's prestige and
sense of self-worth").
150. Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful, supra note 19, at 1185-86 (discussing many
reasons why predecessor counsel may feel that the client has contributed to his own predicament).
151. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 8, Guideline 1.1 cmt., at 923 (noting the emotional toll
of death penalty defense work); Bandes, Repression and Denial, supra note 139, at 342-43
(recounting the case of a defense lawyer who, years after the event, acknowledged that he was so
repelled by his client that he intentionally lost the capital case). See generally Bandes, Repellent
Crimes, supranote 144 (discussing the emotional environment of capital litigation).
152. See Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the
Psychology of Conflict ofInterest, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 189, 199 (2004) (explaining how self-interest
is processed unconsciously, below the level of awareness); see also BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL,
supra note 101, at 8, 81 (explaining the unconscious processing of self-interest). For a review of the
literature and research on the automatic power of self-interest, see Eldred, Prescriptions,supra note
23, at 361-68.
153. See Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 123, at 111 ("[R]esearch on the self-serving bias
has shown that people tend to arrive at judgments of what is fair or right that are biased in the
direction of their own self-interests."); Kim, Naked Self-Interest?,supra note 21, at 137 (describing
"the decades of social cognition research showing that we are motivated by our own economic selfinterest and that we tend to conflate 'fairness' with that which benefits ourselves financially").
154. Kim, The Banality of Fraud,supra note 21, at 1030 & n.305 ("Because we are imperfect
information processors, we first automatically determine our 'preference for a certain outcome on
the basis of self-interest and then justify this preference on the basis of fairness by changing the
importance of attributes."' (quoting Max H. Bazerman et al., The Impossibility of Auditor
Independence, 38 SLOAN MGMT. REv. 89, 91 (1997))).
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other professionals are not immune; rather, like everyone else, they55will
often fail to appreciate how self-interest influences their judgment. 1
In the present context, lawyers accused of ineffectiveness have a
host of self-interested reasons to resist the allegations. Most directly, the
a
determination that a lawyer has been ineffective can be perceived as 56
blemish to that lawyer's professional reputation and good name.1
Indeed, as Formal Opinion 10-456 notes, it is the possibility of such
reputational harm that serves as the rationale for permitting a lawyer to
disclose information that would otherwise be protected under the duty of
confidentiality. 5 7 And, while some have questioned whether such
reputational concerns should matter,158 reputation is, for many lawyers,
the commodity they most cherish. 159 Other, more concrete, injuries can
also flow. In some cases, a lawyer who has been adjudicated ineffective
may find it harder to obtain additional court appointments. 160 And,
while criminal defense lawyers typically have little reason to fear

professional discipline,'16 a finding of ineffectiveness can make it more
more egregious cases-that the disciplinary process
likely-at least in
162
will be initiated.
155. See Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 123, at 121 (describing studies of bankruptcy
lawyers and judges demonstrating the existence of self-serving biases); Page, supra note 113, at
261-65 (reviewing literature on biased decision-making in various professions). For a discussion of
how automatic self-interest can influence the choices made by criminal defense lawyers, see Eldred,
Prescriptions,supra note 23, at 368-74; Eldred, Psychology of Conflicts, supra note 23, at 72-77.
See generally Max H. Bazerman & Deepak Malhotra, Economics Wins, Psychology Loses, and
Society Pays, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 263 (David De Cremer et al. eds., 2006)
(describing research on biased reasoning in various professions, including doctors, lawyers,
accountants, and investment bankers).
156. See Eldred, Psychology of Conflicts, supra note 23, at 75 & n.159 (citing sources
discussing the effects of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the lawyer himself); Joy &
McMunigal, supra note 12, at 44 (noting that defense lawyers accused of ineffectiveness have
reputational interests at stake).
157. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456 (2010).
158. See Newmark, supra note 18, at 731.
159. See Darryl K. Brown, CriminalProcedureEntitlements, Professionalism,and Lawyering
Norms, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 801, 822 n.96 (2000); Judith A. McMorrow et al., Judicial Attitudes
Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View from the Reported Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1425, 1428 n.15 (2004).
160. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 806 n.11 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(describing how the lawyer accused of ineffectiveness based on an alleged conflict of interest was
not "fully disinterested," in that he "ha[d] an interest in disavowing any conflict of interest so that
he may receive other court appointments that [could be] a source of clients for the criminal defense
work of the partners' practice").
161. See Bruce A. Green, CriminalNeglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective,
52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1186 (2003); Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the
Wrongs with Rights We Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 10 (1995).
162. There are at least three reasons for this conclusion. First, because all lawyers have a
mandatory reporting requirement under Model Rule 8.3, any violation that raises a substantial
question as to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness to practice law must be reported to
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How will these negative emotions and self-interested motivations
influence the choices that lawyers make when responding to claims of
ineffectiveness? Recall that one of the primary constraints on motivated
reasoning is the competing desire for accuracy, meaning that reasoning
towards a desired conclusion flourishes when there is room to
maneuver. 163 Determining the power of motivated reasoning for defense
lawyers in post-conviction cases, therefore, requires careful scrutiny of
the obligations set forth in Guideline 10.13 and other relevant authority.
To begin, Guideline 10.13 is crafted in a manner that limits the
likelihood of motivated reasoning being deployed to defeat its core goal
of giving primacy to the interests of the client. 164 Some of the duties in
Guideline 10.13 simply do not provide much room for motivated
reasoning. For example, it would be hard for a defense lawyer to
plausibly argue that there is no obligation to turn over the entire case file
to successor counsel. 165 As a result, there is little reason to believe that
lawyers will attempt to find a rationalization not to do so. Similarly, the
categorical obligations to safeguard the best interests of the former client
and to cooperate fully with successor counsel make it hard for
predecessor counsel to completely ignore these obligations
under a
66
belief that there is a plausible reason for such conduct.
At the same time, as with any set of obligations, there is space for
interpretation. It is, therefore, in these interstices where motivated
reasoning is likely to occur. Recognizing this and the power of
motivated reasoning already described, courts applying Guideline 10.13,

the appropriate professional authority. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2013). And,
while not every finding of ineffectiveness triggers a duty to report, a finding of ineffectiveness
based on egregious error arguably does so. See Henak, supranote 34, at 357-58 (discussing Model
Rule 8.3's obligations for findings of ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Ariz. Comm. on
Rules of Proftl Conduct, Op. 98-02 (1998). Second, while judges are often reluctant to report
findings of ineffectiveness to disciplinary authorities, the fact that such referrals do occur should be
enough to ring a cautionary bell for defense lawyers. See CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 74 (Gerald Uelmen ed., 2008) [hereinafter CCFA FINAL REPORT]; see also
Graham, supra note 81, at 1674-75 & n.171 (citing cases showing judicial reluctance to report
ineffective assistance of counsel); McMorrow et al., supra note 159, at 1436 & n.50 (citing cases
demonstrating the reluctance ofjudges to report ineffective assistance of counsel). Indeed, at least in
one state--California-there is an effort underway to encourage such referrals in appropriate cases.
See CCFA FINAL REPORT, supra, at 74-75. Third, there is at least some evidence that disciplinary
counsel do not initiate charges against defense lawyers until the record is fully developed through a
post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Donald R. Lundberg, Two Case
Studies in the Exercise of Discretionin Lawyer DisciplineSystems, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 107, 108.
163. See supra Part IH.A.
164. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 8, Guideline 10.13 cmt., at 1074-75.
165. Seeid.
166. See id. Guideline 10.13, at 1074.
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and lawyers considering the obligations167that it imposes, must keep a
steady eye on its client-centered purpose.
Take, for example, perhaps the most important duty of predecessor
counsel: to provide successor counsel with information regarding all
aspects of the representation of the former client, including details about
the strategic thinking that took place during the case. 168 This duty is
complicated, and certainly requires predecessor counsel to help
successor counsel understand which areas of factual and legal inquiry
were undertaken, which were not, and the reasons for those decisions or
omissions. 69 Yet, there is a degree of flexibility in how to interpret these
obligations. Must the lawyer discuss every aspect of decision-making, or
only those which predecessor counsel considers significant? What
information may predecessor counsel offer freely, even if not sought
directly by successor counsel, and which must await a request? Can
predecessor counsel assume that much of the file will speak for itself, or
must there be an affirmative effort to provide explanations for any
ambiguities-and, if so, what is the proper standard for determining
what is ambiguous? These and other questions open the doors to
motivated answers. Successor counsel might volunteer only a small
percentage of available information; or limit the amount of time that is
made available to successor counsel for an interview; or fail to return
phone calls in a timely manner; or engage in any other number of actions
that could burden successor counsel's efforts to prove the defendant's
claim. None of these actions would be consistent with effective
assistance during the course of a representation, and hence, none of them
should be tolerated in a situation where successor 70counsel has "a
continuing duty to safeguard the interests of the client."
In addition, most claims for ineffectiveness are litigated long after
the defendant was sentenced, requiring predecessor counsel to remember
events years after they happened.17 ' Recall that people tend to remember
information in a manner that is favorable to their goals, and then truncate
their search upon finding it. 172 Unless there are contemporaneous notes
167. See id. Guideline 10.13 cmt., at1075.
168. See id. Guideline 10.13, at 1074.
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. See Eve Brensike Primus, StructuralReform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 679, 695 (2007) (discussing the extensive delay
that typically occurs between the sentencing of a defendant and collateral proceedings brought to
challenge the effectiveness of counsel).
172. See SIMON, supra note 99, at 110 (discussing the many psychological factors that
influence memory, explaining the various reasons why recall can be biased by directional goals, and
noting that memories are "susceptible to motivational influences also because perception itself can
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recording decisions that were made-a duty discussed in more detail
below-predecessor counsel will need to rely on memory to recall the
details of what transpired during the representation of the former client.
Motivated to reduce the chance of being found ineffective, lawyers will
naturally favor memories that benefit their own interests over those of
their former clients.
Once again, Wood serves as an example. 1' 3 As previously noted, the
question was whether the three-member trial team made a strategic
decision to curtail investigation into the defendant's mental health
deficiencies upon reviewing a psychologist's report that had been
prepared for the defense. 174 At the habeas hearing, which occurred more
than six years after the trial, none of the lawyers could recall much
regarding the psychologist's report. 75 For example, the lead lawyer
could not recall whether he was present during the defendant's
psychological assessment or whether he ever met with the
psychologist. 76 The lawyer primarily responsible for the penalty phase
had a hard time even remembering the doctor's name or what
interactions, if any, he had with him. 177 Yet, notwithstanding their
expansive lack of recall, both lawyers, as well as the third lawyer who
was more tangentially involved, were able to remember that they did, in
fact, review the psychologist's report, which later became the key factual
finding to deny the ineffectiveness claim. 78 Was this a process of
selective recall, 179 remembering facts that would benefit the lawyers, but
not recalling those that would damage their self-interests? It is certainly
be shaped by motivation"); supra note 95 and accompanying text. In Dishonest Deed, Clear
Conscience. Self-Preservation Through Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting,Lisa Shu
and her colleagues state:
Individuals are persistent "revisionist historians" when recalling their pasts. They
tend to recall selectively in ways that support their decisions; for instance people engage
in "choice supportive memory distortion" for past choices, over-attributing positive
features to options chosen and negative features to options not chosen. This memory bias
does not exist for experimenter-assigned selections, but does exist when people are led to
an incorrect belief about what their previous choice was. These findings point to the role
of motivation in recall.
Lisa Shu et al., Dishonest Deed, Clear Conscience: Self-Preservation Through Moral
Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting 6 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 09-078, 2009)
(citations omitted).
173. Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 296 (2010).
174. Id. at 295-96.
175. Id. at 296.
176. See Joint Appendix, supranote 93, at 343-45.
177. Seeid.
178. See Wood, 558 U.S. at 301-02.
179. See Kathleen M. Schmitt et al., Why PartisansSee Mass Media as Biased,31 COMM. RES.
623, 625 (2004) (defining selective recall as paying more attention to, and therefore remembering
more clearly, aspects of content that are hostile to your own beliefs).
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possible.1 80 After all, had the lawyers denied remembering whether they
reviewed the report, it would have been much easier for the habeas

court, and any subsequent reviewing court, to conclude that the decision
to end the investigation into the defendant's mental health was the result

of neglect or oversight.
The confidentiality obligations of predecessor counsel are also

susceptible to motivated responses. One of the core questions in postconviction litigation, as described in Part II, is whether predecessor

counsel can share information with the prosecution prior to any court
ordered disclosure."' On this point, will the lawyer follow ABA Formal
Opinion 10-456 and conclude that the limited self-defense exception to

the duty of confidentiality rarely, if ever, justifies such disclosure? Or,
will the lawyer decide that informal disclosure to the prosecution is
appropriate? Again, motivated reasoning helps to predict the result.
Because the ABA Opinion provides only guidance on how ethical
questions should be resolved, a lawyer can easily rationalize the self-

interested answer by reasoning that, in the absence of binding authority
to the contrary, there is no need to follow its conclusions. Even if this

choice is not made consciously, the strong automatic power of selfinterest can override any concerns the lawyer may have about protecting
the interests of the former client, allowing the lawyer to conclude that
broad permissive disclosure is acceptable. This is precisely why it is
necessary for courts and lawyers to understand clearly that the
fundamental tenets of professional ethics embodied in Guideline1 810.13
2
entrust this decision to successor counsel, not predecessor counsel.
Similar concerns will arise when predecessor counsel face decisions
about the attorney-client privilege. Again, Guideline 10.13 has
anticipated the issue, and provides the appropriate framework for
sheltering the client from the predictable exigencies of predecessor
counsel's moment of stress. 18 3 Guideline 10.13 ties predecessor counsel
to the mast of client interests
before the sirens of self-interest assault her
18 4
litigation.
of
storm
in the
In cases where a court finds that the filing of the ineffectiveness
claim constitutes a limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege, and
180. This conclusion is buttressed by the remarkable lack of memory all three of the lawyers
had regarding the case. Over the course of his questioning, lead counsel responded, "I do not
recall," over seventy-seven times, whereas the lawyer primarily responsible for the penalty phase
responded, "I do not recall," over ninety-one times. See Joint Appendix, supra note 93, at 343-45.
The third attorney's memory was even worse. Id.
181. See supra Part H.A.
182. See supra Part ll.A.1.
183. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 8, Guideline 10.13, at 1074.
184. See id.
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for some reason there is no successor counsel involved, 185 the
predecessor lawyer will need to decide which information is, and is not,
subject to disclosure. Will the lawyer utilize this discretion to justify
broad or limited disclosure? Here, the framing of the question matters. If
the lawyer sees the issue solely as a matter of staying within the bounds
of the court's order, then any information that meets the liberal
evidentiary standard for relevancy-that is, "any tendency" to be of
concern in the habeas proceeding-can be disclosed. 186 In contrast, if the
lawyer frames the issue as one of professional duty owed to the former
client, and considers ethical obligations in deciding how to respond, then
the lawyer would be required to limit the court ordered disclosure as
much as possible-by releasing only the information the lawyer believes
is necessary to the claim; challenging, if possible, the scope of the court
ordered waiver of privilege; seeking a protective order to restrict access
to the disclosed information; asking for in camera review of any
18 7
questionable material; or by asserting other non-frivolous objections.
According to motivated reasoning research, predecessor counsel facing
ineffective assistance claims will choose the path that is more likely to
lead to counsel's desired result.1 88 For lawyers who want to maximize
their chances of being found effective, framing the disclosure as a
response to the ineffectiveness allegations-as opposed to a limited
response protecting the attorney-client privilege-will make it easier to
rationalize a broad disclosure of information.
Perhaps this is what happened in Purkey, the case that started this
discussion. 189 There, the court order directing predecessor counsel to file
an affidavit was broad, in that it did not limit disclosure to only that
185. Although this situation is inconsistent with the ABA Guidelines, which contemplate
continuous representation throughout the life of each capital case, it does in fact occur because
states' systems for the provision of post-conviction counsel in capital cases vary widely in their onthe-ground effectiveness. See Eric M. Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in Capital State
Post-Conviction Proceedings After Martinez and Pinholster, 41 HOFSTRA L. REv. 591, 591-92
(2013).
186. See FED. R. EViD. 401 (defining as relevant any evidence if "(a) it has any tendency to

make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of
consequence in determining the action"); GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 23 (3d ed. 2013) ("It would
be hard to devise a more lenient standard of probativeness than Rule 401's 'any tendency'

standard.").
187. See discussion supraPart II.A.2.
188. See Helzer & Dunning, supra note 22, at 381-82. For example, people tend to seek out
confirming evidence when they ask themselves, "Am I extroverted?" This makes them likely to
perceive themselves as gregarious and outgoing. In contrast, people tend to seek out evidence that
they are reticent and private when they ask themselves, "Am I shy?" This, in turn, often leads them
to believe they are more reserved. Id.; see discussion supraPart III.A.
189. Purkey v. United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W, 2010 WL 4386532, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Oct.
28, 2010); see supra Part I.
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which was needed to resolve the claim. 190 The frame used by
predecessor counsel to decide how to respond might explain what
happened next. Given the power of motivated reasoning, the expansive
117-page affidavit may have resulted from counsel simply asking
himself: "What information is responsive to the court order?"-rather
than asking a question that focused on the best interests of his former
client, such as: "how can I try to limit the disclosure ordered by the
court?" Though attempting to peer into the decision-making process of
predecessor counsel is largely speculative at this point, 91 research on
motivated reasoning suggests that, even if predecessor counsel did not
consciously choose a frame that better aligned with his own interests, a
motivated process would have achieved the same result.' 92
The Purkey case also introduces a slightly different wrinkle. Recall
that Purkey's trial lawyer initially resisted disclosure, but later responded
to the court's order with an affidavit including extensive legal
argumentation as to why he was not ineffective. 193 What explains why a
lawyer would seemingly seek to protect the defendant's interests, at least
initially, but then have such a change of heart thereafter? One possible
explanation comes from research on what is called "moral selflicensing," which describes the phenomenon in which past moral deeds
make "people more likely to do potentially immoral things without
worrying about feeling or appearing immoral."'

94

Documented in

various domains-including demonstrations of prejudice, charitable
giving, and consumer purchasing of luxury goods-researchers have
demonstrated how prior conduct that is deemed socially worthy can
permit future selfish or otherwise immoral behavior. 195 Two possible
explanations have been offered for this phenomenon. The first is that
people monitor their own moral credit, similar to a bank account, such
that a deposit (acting morally) permits a withdrawal (acting immorally),
190. Indeed, the trial court arguably issued an order that exceeded even the relevancy standard.
See Purkey v. United States, No. 01-00308-01-CR-W, 2009 WL 3160774, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Sept.

29, 2009).
191. No independent assessment of the affidavit is possible, as it was filed under seal by court
order and is therefore not available for viewing. See id. at *7.However, this should not be taken to
mean that predecessor counsel took the initiative to protect Purkey's interests after the court issued
its order. Rather, the request for the protective order was initiated by successor counsel, and the
formal motion was made by the prosecution. See id.
192. See discussion supraPart III.A.
193. See Purkey, 2009 WL 3160774, at *7.

194. Anna C. Merritt et al., Moral Self-Licensing: When Being Good Frees Us to Be Bad, 4
Soc. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 344, 344 (2010); see also Benoit Monin & Dale T.
Miller, Moral Credentialsand the Expression of Prejudice,81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
33, 34 (2001).
195. Merritt et al., supra note 194, at 346-48.
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yet leaves the account balanced. 196 The second is that past acts change
the meaning of future ones, such that prior moral acts help convince a
person that they are moral, and thus the future conduct (even if immoral
in an objective sense) is deemed permissible. 197 Perhaps this is what can
happen when a court orders predecessor counsel to file an affidavit
responding to allegations of ineffectiveness: the more the lawyer had
before the order, the more room
attempted to protect the client's interests
198
there is to act selfishly after the order.
Finally, there is the duty to maintain files in a proper manner. 199
Given the problems of selective recall, the documentation requirement of
Guideline 10.13-requiring lawyers in death penalty cases to maintain
contemporary records in a manner that will inform successor counsel of
significant developments in the case-becomes that much more
important. 20 0 To be sure, this obligation, if followed, would go a long
way to rectifying some of the problems with memory that have been
described. But, there are also reasons to be cautious about the accuracy
of contemporary records. Research has indicated, for example, that
contemporaneous notes taken during interviews of crime victims often
omit important details. 20 ' Other studies have compared contemporaneous
notes of police interviews to later official police reports, finding that the
later reports often include information recalled by the interviewer from
memory that were not in the contemporaneous notes themselves. 0 2
Motivations, such as self-serving biases and pre-existing views about the
interview subject, can undermine the accuracy of contemporaneous
notes and distort the records that are generated.20 3 While the external
196. Id at 349.
197. Id
198. See id. One more time, Guideline 10.13 serves to deter these potential problems. ABA
GUIDELINES, supra note 8, Guideline 10.13 & cmt., at 1074-75. As already indicated, predecessor
counsel knows that successor counsel (a lawyer who will presumptively be acting competently) will
seek to resolve all debatable issues of privilege in the client's favor, and predecessor counsel will be
required to act accordingly. See supranotes 61-62 and accompanying text.
199. See ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 8, Guideline 10.13, at 1074.
200. See Schmitt et al., supranote 179, at 625.
201. See, e.g., Michael E. Lamb et al., Accuracy of Investigators' Verbatim Notes of Their
ForensicInterviews with Alleged ChildAbuse Victims, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 699, 703-04 (2000)
(finding that twenty-five percent of the forensically relevant utterances from child abuse victims and
more than fifty percent of the utterances by interviewers themselves did not make it into the
contemporaneous notes of the interviews); see also SIMON, supra note 99, at 40 (discussing studies
about the accuracy of investigatory notes).
202. See Amy Hyman Gregory et al., A Comparison of U.S. Police Interviewers' Notes with
Their Subsequent Reports, 8 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 203, 212-14

(2011).
203. See Becky Milne & Ray Bull, Interviewing Victims of Crime, Including Children and
People with Intellectual Disabilities,in PRACTICAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR FORENSIC INVESTIGATIONS

AND PROSECUTIONS 1, 11-12 (Mark R. Kebbell & Graham M. Davies eds., 2006) (describing how
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validity of such studies is not known, it would not be surprising to find
out that the efforts of predecessor counsel to record earlier events are
inaccurate in important details. Indeed, given the powerful ways in
which motivation can influence memory, recall, and interpretation of
information, it is likely that, in many instances, such records-whether
interview notes, correspondence, formal memos to the file, or mere
jottings about the case-would be subject to the same errors in judgment
that have been described above.2 °4
Because many of the obligations set forth in Guideline 10.13 and
the related authority offer predecessor counsel significant discretion in
making responsive disclosures after a claim of ineffectiveness has been
filed, there is good reason to believe that lawyers with strong motives to
resist the claim will engage in asymmetric skepticism in deciding how to
respond. The likely result is that predecessor counsel's choices will be
self-serving, advancing the attorney's own interests rather than those of
the former client.
2. Lawyers Motivated to Comply with Professional Duty
What about those lawyers who, from time to time, willingly
cooperate with successor counsel, for example, by filing affidavits that
concede some form of deficient performance? Are they simply able to
overcome their emotions and self-interest to meet their professional
duties to their former clients? Perhaps, as some people can overcome
20 5
their implicit biases through the sheer power of rational deliberation.
The research on motivated reasoning, however, provides another
explanation: these lawyers' primary motivation is to protect the interests
of their former clients.20 6 In these instances, Guideline 10.13 and related
authority may assist lawyers in achieving legal outcomes that are
satisfying to all stakeholders: themselves, their clients, the profession,
and the justice system.
To start, some lawyers possess a strong moral antipathy toward the
death penalty that outweighs the self-interested concerns that have been
discussed. For these lawyers, the conscious desire to prevent the former
client's execution may be the primary motivation, meaning that they
pre-existing views regarding an interviewee can bias the information obtained); see also Saul K.
Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 3, 26 (2010) (arguing in favor of requiring videotaped confessions so that trial judges and
juries would have an "an objective and accurate record of the process by which a statement was
taken-a common source of dispute that results from ordinary forgetting and self-serving distortions
in memory").
204. See Kassin et al., supra note 203, at 25.
205. See Eldred, Psychology of Conflicts, supra note 23, at 70-71.
206. See Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful, supra note 19, at 1185.
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would be consciously willing to sacrifice their own self-interests for
those of their clients.

207

Take, for example, Harrisv. Dugger,208 a capital

case in which predecessor counsel, who had conceded error in his
mitigation investigation, announced his opposition to the death penalty
on cross-examination. 209 In such cases, where counsel's conscious and

unconscious motivations can be expected to work together, there will be
little danger that her motivated reasoning will undermine the
professional obligations owed to the former client.210
Other lawyers may conclude that it is in their reputational interest
to admit to errors that serve as the basis for the ineffectiveness
allegation. As many scholars have noted, informal norms can regulate
the behavior of lawyers through imposing reputational costs on members
who do not conform to the dominant ethos of the local community in
which they practice.2 1' Too often, practice norms for criminal defense
lawyers discourage the protection of client interests.212 Yet, there are
also communities of practice where the informal norms encourage
conduct that benefits clients.2 13 One might assume, for example, that
lawyers who work for public defender offices-at least those in which
there is a strong ethos of client protection-might regard allegations of
ineffectiveness as simply part of the job.214 For these lawyers, the motive

207. For a discussion of lawyers dedicated to the end of the death penalty, see generally Austin
Sarat, NarrativeStrategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (1996).
208. 874 F.2d 756 (11 th Cir. 1989).
209. See id. at 761 n.4.
210. See Moore & Loewenstein, supra note 152, at 190 (explaining that automatic self-interest
and rational or controlled processes of reason often do not clash, but instead work together to
produce judgment and behavior).
211. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
9-11 (1991); Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
1043, 1045-49; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2021-25 (1995); W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession:Social Norms in
ProfessionalCommunities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955, 1969 (2001). For a discussion of the powerful
effects that reputation generated by group norms can have on automatic processes, see Jonathan
Haidt & Selin Kesebir, Morality, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 797, 797-832 (Susan T.
Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010); Page, supra note 113, at 250 (citing a number of studies that
demonstrate the power of group dynamics on automatic processing and decision-making).
212. For a detailed discussion, see Brown, supra note 159, at 802, 819-33.
213. See Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2152 (2013).
214. See id. (describing multiple reasons why so many criminal defense lawyers provide
inadequate representation, but noting that "[slome jurisdictions have provided the resources,
independence, structure, and supervision that enable capable, caring, and dedicated lawyers to
zealously represent their clients"). For a discussion of high quality defender organizations where
caseloads are manageable, see NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS
AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 192-228 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publications/books/Is sclaid def securing reasonablecaseloads.authcheckdam.pdf.
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to protect client interests may be dominant, again suggesting that both
conscious and unconscious motives would work in the same direction.
Finally, there are lawyers who willingly admit ineffectiveness, but
for whom there is not an obvious motive for doing so. Here, one can
only speculate what motivates their conduct. Some may genuinely place
the interests of their clients above their own, despite the negative
consequences that could flow from a finding of ineffectiveness. Others
may not care about their professional reputation by the time a
claim of ineffectiveness arises. Maybe they have been disbarred for
other misconduct and are therefore essentially immune from
community censure. 2 15 Or, maybe they have such little regard for their
public persona that a finding of ineffectiveness could hardly cause
reputational harm.216
In sum, the research on motivated reasoning provides a valuable
prism through which to understand how lawyers can be expected to
respond when accused of ineffective assistance. For lawyers whose
primary interest is to resist such allegations, and where there is
discretion on how to interpret or respond to the duties owed to former
clients, they can be expected to engage in preference-consistent
reasoning. It is in these situations that Guideline 10.13 has bite,
forestalling what would otherwise likely be reduced compliance with the
professional obligation to prioritize client interests.2 17 In contrast, for
lawyers whose primary motivation runs in favor of protecting the
interests of a former client, the power of unconscious reasoning will
pose little danger to compliance with professional obligations, and
Guideline 10.13 and related authority can serve to support the attorneys'
laudable goals.

215. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1423 (2011) (noting that defendant's trial
lawyer, who provided successor counsel with a series of declarations concerning the case, had been

disbarred by that time).
216.

This may explain the expansive concessions of error by predecessor counsel in Cheatham,

where the trial lawyer who was found ineffective had a history of running for various political
offices, including governor, while dressed as Thomas Jefferson. Kansas v. Cheatham, 292 P.3d 318,

323-24 (Kan. 2013). The Kansas Supreme Court made special note of these activities in its opinion:
[Predecessor counsel] described his political activities ... as a "hobby" that he

engaged in as a "bully pulpit" to express disagreement with certain public policies, such
as the Iraq war. Often, [counsel] said, he would attend political events dressed in
costume as Thomas Jefferson to reflect [his] views about the original underpinnings to
the United States Constitution.
Id. In addition, the court noted that "these political and professional activities occupied a significant

enough portion of [counsel's] time that he wanted [defendant] to acknowledge they would coincide
with the defense of the murder charges." Id. at 324.
217.

See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 8, Guideline 10.13, at 1074.
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THE IMPLICATIONS OF MOTIVATION

Reducing biased judgments of predecessor counsel in
ineffectiveness cases will not be easy. For example, research indicates
that merely informing people about their implicit biases is of marginal
utility in improving decision-making.218 As a result, other strategies are
needed. This Part sets forth recommendations that may be more
successful-including explicit acknowledgment by courts of the
importance of reading Guideline 10.13 with an unwavering focus on its
client-centered purpose; encouraging judicial supervision of disclosures
made by predecessor counsel in ineffectiveness cases; encouraging
judges in post-conviction cases to account for motivated reasoning when
making credibility assessments of predecessor counsel; and encouraging
successor counsel to learn about strategies that can help reduce
implicit bias.219
A.

UnderstandingGuideline 10.13

In large measure, Guideline 10.13 is clearly written, as it forcefully
and unambiguously states the two primary obligations of predecessor
counsel: "to safeguard the interests [of the former] client," and to
"cooperate fully with successor counsel. 22 °
As noted earlier, any interstitial interpretations that may need to be
made in particular cases should conform to these purposes. 221 Thus, for
example, hide-and-seek behavior is simply inconsistent with predecessor
counsel's ethical duties under Guideline 10.13.222 Predecessor counsel
has an affirmative duty to volunteer all information relevant to the
representation, even in the absence of a specific request from successor
counsel. 223 Similarly, the duty of cooperation includes a timeliness
element, meaning that predecessor counsel must respond to requests for
information without delay.224

218. Research reveals that people are unable to control subconscious biases even when they are
aware of them. Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-LiteracyEducation, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 24849 & n.239 (2008) (citing Asher Koriat et al., Reasons for Confidence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 107, 114, 117 (1980)); see Timothy D. Wilson et al.,
Mental Contaminationand the Debiasing Problem, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF lNrurIVE JUDGMENT 185, 189-92 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
219. See infra Part 1V.A-D.

220. ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 8, Guideline 10.13, at 1074.
221. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
222. ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 8, Guideline 10.13, at 1074.
223. See supra Part II.A.
224. See supraPart ILA.
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In addition, for the reasons already discussed, safeguarding the
interests of the former client requires both predecessor and successor
counsel to act to minimize any compelled disclosure of client
information.22 5 This includes reminding predecessor counsel of the duty
to assert the attorney-client privilege until disclosure is ordered by the
court, and after the court's order, to take all permissible steps to
minimize the scope of disclosure. To minimize disclosure, counsel may
seek ex parte and in camera review of any document that plausibly might
still be considered privileged, pursue appropriate protective orders, and
consider appellate remedies if the court ordered disclosure is broader
than necessary to resolve the ineffectiveness claim. 26
Further, both successor and predecessor counsel must be vigilant in
maintaining the position of Formal Opinion 10-456--that informal
disclosure of information from predecessor counsel to the prosecution
prior to a court order is not permissible.227 Successor counsel should,
moreover, remind predecessor counsel that the self-defense exception is
permissive, not mandatory, and that any disclosures made under the selfdefense exception must be narrowly tailored to protect as much
confidential information as possible.228
B. JudicialSupervision ofDisclosure
As noted earlier, some courts have been willing to oversee the
process of disclosure without much concern for the additional burden it
might cause; in some instances, courts have required in camera review of
any proposed disclosures by predecessor counsel.22 9 Other courts,
however, have been hesitant to oversee the process of disclosure, fearing
great burdens given the large number of ineffectiveness
cases that are
23 1
litigated each year. 230 Which is the right approach?
The research on motivated reasoning provides two arguments in
favor of greater judicial supervision. The first is obvious-by taking the
225. See supraPart II.
226. See supranotes 32, 58 and accompanying text.
227. See supraPart II.A.2.
228. See supraPart II.
229. See supranotes 56-58 and accompanying text.
230. See Siegel, Withhold from the Prosecution, supra note 12, at 21-22 (citing cases
demonstrating courts' hesitance to oversee the process of disclosure).
231. Even before considering how motivated reasoning might mediate this dispute, it seems
that-at least in death penalty cases where the ultimate penalty is so grave, and which concern only
a small percentage of overall habeas litigation-courts would not be too severely overtaxed by
engaging in a priori review of proposed disclosures by predecessor counsel. As a result, the
objection that supervision will be too burdensome loses most of its force in the death penalty
context.
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decision out of the hands of the biased decision-maker, bias will be
lessened.232 In the present context, this means ensuring that it is the
court, rather than predecessor counsel, that makes the final disclosure
determinations. For example, more courts could follow the procedure
used in some cases, in which predecessor counsel submits the trial file to
the court, which in turn decides (with the input of successor counsel) the
items that should be disclosed to the prosecution.2 33 If this approach is
deemed too burdensome (or otherwise unwise), a modified approach
may be available: predecessor counsel would be ordered to prepare a
draft affidavit (with attachments) responding to the allegations in the
petition, which would be submitted to successor counsel for review prior
to disclosure. Successor counsel, in turn, would be permitted to make
objections, flagging for the court those aspects of the affidavit that
successor counsel believes should not be disclosed. The court would
resolve the dispute and decide whether the proposed disclosure was
appropriate. Only then would the affidavit be finalized and disclosed to
the prosecution. The benefit of this procedure is that court involvement
would reduce the power of motivational bias by shifting much of the
final decision-making authority to the court.
A second reason for increased judicial scrutiny concerns the power
of accountability. Multiple studies demonstrate that the power of biased
decision-making is reduced when the decision-maker is aware that his
choice will be evaluated by others.2 34 Where the desires of the audience
are not known, decision-makers engage in a form of preemptive selfcriticism in which they anticipate and take account of the objections they
are likely to face.23 5 This results in increased accuracy.2 36 As long as the
court itself has not already predetermined the result it wants-for
example, by signaling that it will rule that disclosure should be as broad

232. See supra Part III.A.
233. See Siegel, Withhold from the Prosecution, supra note 12, at 26 n.55. Notably, there are
courts that have ordered even more protection than this recommendation. See, e.g., Jones v. United

States, No. 4:11CV00702, 2012 WL 484663, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 14, 2012) (refusing to require a
court ordered affidavit, instead requiring predecessor counsel to testify in court prior to any
disclosure, then, prior to cross-examination, ordering an in camera review of any proposed
disclosures).
234. See Richard P. Larrick, Debiasing, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 316, 322-23 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004); Jennifer S. Lemer &
Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 255

(1999) (reviewing literature discussing accountability).
235.
236.

See Lerner & Tetlock, supranote 234, at 257.
See SIMON, supra note 99, at 39 ("Accountability has been found to lead to closer

attention to evidence, higher calibration between confidence and accuracy, increased sophistication
of thought processes, and lower effects of emotions on unrelated judgments."); Lemer & Tetlock,
supra note 234, at 257.
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as possible-lawyers evaluating what information to disclose to
prosecutors will be more accurate in their judgments when the lawyer
expects to be supervised by the court.
Of course, judicial supervision will not eliminate all bias. There are
judges who will doubtlessly resent being asked to assess the propriety of
disclosures by predecessor counsel, and as a result, such judges may not
adequately exercise this function. In addition, judges are not immune to
the same implicit biases of judgment that affect everyone else.237
Therefore, judicial supervision is not a miracle cure. That acknowledged,
shifting to the court responsibility to review proposed disclosures is
preferable to allowing prosecutors to approach predecessor counsel
unsupervised, given the powerful biases that can guide counsel to
defensively attempt to minimize the chance of being found ineffective,
and the dire consequences for defendants who are denied relief.
C. Assessing Credibilityof PredecessorCounsel Testimony
The same concerns that encourage judicial supervision of
disclosures by predecessor counsel apply to other aspects of postconviction litigation. Perhaps the place where this is most important is
judicial assessment of the credibility of witnesses in post-conviction
cases. In all situations where predecessor counsel's testimony matters,
courts should be attuned to the significant possibility that implicit
motivation is likely to color what predecessor counsel says. That is,
courts should bear in mind these powerful motivations when making
credibility determinations and assessing whether a lawyer has provided
accurate testimony during post-conviction proceedings. Some courts
already judge skeptically the testimony of lawyers who admit to error,
with at least a subtle suggestion that biases may be influencing such
testimony. 2 8 The research on motivated reasoning suggests that, given
the reasons for lawyers to resist allegations of ineffectiveness, more
concern should be paid to whether lawyers are unintentionally skewing
their testimony in their own favor.

237. See Bibas, supra note 16, at 2-6 (discussing hindsight bias).
238. See, e.g., Walls v. Bowersox, 151 F.3d 827, 836 (8th Cir. 1998) (viewing counsel's
concession with "extreme skepticism"); Gentry v. Sinclair, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1154 n.38 (W.D.
Wash. 2008), aff'd, 705 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that, "given the understandable desire
to protect a former client, a concession by trial counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is not
conclusive for purposes of the Sixth Amendment").
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D. Educating Successor Counsel
Finally, successor counsel should be educated about strategies that
can be effective in reducing implicit bias. One of the most significant
strategies is counter-factual thinking, which entails taking positions that
are inconsistent with those expected to be produced by the bias.23 9 For
predecessor counsel whose motive is to resist allegations of
ineffectiveness, this would mean consciously attempting to take
positions that would assist, rather than resist, the allegations of
ineffectiveness. Of course, given the motivations that so many lawyers
have toward self-preservation, it would be foolish to expect predecessor
counsel to take the initiative to learn about and implement such
strategies on their own. But successor counsel might be able to employ
them as part of the litigation strategy. For example, while talking to
predecessor counsel, successor counsel might ask: "Can I ask you to
assume for a moment that you are not the lawyer who is the subject of
this litigation? If you were bringing this post-conviction claim on behalf
of the defendant, what strategies would you think would be most
effective?"--or something to that effect. How to employ such efforts to
strip the bias from predecessor counsel would have to be considered
carefully, but there is no reason why successor counsel-armed with
sufficient background in the psychology of implicit bias-should not be
able to find ways to help predecessor counsel reduce their own
motivated reasoning.240
V.

CONCLUSION

Wesley Ira Purkey remains on death row.24' But, more than a
decade ago, another defendant, Walter Mickens, was executed for
murdering a teenager, even though his trial lawyer had been representing
the victim in an unrelated matter at the time of the crime.242 What was
239. Linda Babcock et al., CreatingConvergence: DebiasingBiased Litigants,22 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 913, 916 (1997) (discussing techniques to reduce bias). Recognizing these benefits,
scholars have advanced reforms meant to encourage prosecutors to engage in counter-factual
thinking. See, e.g., Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512, 523-24 (2007),
240. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Any lawyer who wants a comprehensive
discussion of the psychology of decision-making and the power of motivation in the criminal justice
process should start with Professor Dan Simon's recent book, In Doubt: The Psychology of the
CriminalJustice Process.See generally SIMON, supranote 99.
241. See Michael Doyle, Boston Bombing Case May Take Years to Unfold, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 26, 2013, http://www.adn.com/2013/04/26/2880713_boston-bombing-case-maytake-years.html (noting that Purkey received a death sentence in 2003 and "has since filed more
than a dozen lawsuits and appeals," one of which-an appeal-remains pending).
242. See Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful, supra note 19, at 1181-84. For a more
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the critical evidence that doomed Mickens's claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel despite this glaring conflict of interest? According
to the record, it was the trial lawyer's own post-conviction testimony in
which counsel stated that his representation of the victim had not
influenced the choices he made on behalf of Mickens in any way.243
Lawrence Fox, who chaired the ABA's efforts to adopt the ABA
Guidelines, correctly views this bewildering testimony as a glaring
example of why Guideline 10.13 is so important: it sets down in detail
how lawyers, such as Mickens's trial attorney, are supposed to respond
to allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. 244 But at the same
time, Mickens v. Taylor245 is also a cautionary tale about how lawyers,
motivated to protect their own self-interests, can rationalize their own
misbehavior and thereby undermine the very purposes that the
Guidelines are meant to achieve.24 6 Simply put: motivation matters. And,
because it does, efforts to reduce its power, such as those recommended
here, must matter more.

detailed discussion of Mickens v. Taylor, see Eldred, Psychology of Conflicts, supra note 23, at 4445.
243. See Mickens v. Taylor, 536 U.S. 162, 177 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
244. Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningfil, supra note 19, at 1182-84.
245. 536 U.S. 162 (2002).
246. See Eldred, Psychology of Conflicts, supra note 23, at 76 & n.162 (describing how
Mickens's trial lawyer was motivated by economic and reputational interests). See generally ABA
GUIDELINES, supra note 8, Guideline 1.1, at 919 ("The objective of these Guidelines is to set forth a
national standard of practice for the defense of capital cases in order to ensure high quality legal
representation for all persons facing the possible imposition... of a death sentence .... ").
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